Who Could Possibly be Against a Treaty for the Blind? by Scheinwald, Aaron
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal 
Volume 22 Volume XXII 
Number 2 Volume XXII Book 2 Article 6 
2012 
Who Could Possibly be Against a Treaty for the Blind? 
Aaron Scheinwald 
Fordham University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Aaron Scheinwald, Who Could Possibly be Against a Treaty for the Blind?, 22 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media 
& Ent. L.J. 445 (2012). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol22/iss2/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, 
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Who Could Possibly be Against a Treaty for the Blind? 
Cover Page Footnote 
J.D. Candidate, 2012, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2005, University of California-Berkeley. I 
would like to thank Anne Kelsey for suggesting this topic; my advisor, Professor Hugh Hansen, for his 
guidance and advice; Professor Katherine Hughes, Professor Greg Milne and the participants of the Fall 
2010 Leitner Advanced Topics in Human Rights seminar for their input; and the editors and staff of the 
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal for their editing, support and patience. 
This note is available in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal: 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol22/iss2/6 
SCHEINWALD.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2012 5:13 PM 
 
445 
―Who Could  Possibly be Against a 
Treaty for the Blind?‖1 
Aaron Scheinwald  
 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 448 
I. WHAT ARE VIPS AND HOW DOES THEIR CURRENT 
STATUS PRESENT A HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEM?  AN 
EPIDEMIOLOGY AND A HISTORY OF NATIONAL AND 
GLOBAL SOLUTIONS TO THE VIP INFORMATION-
ACCESS PROBLEM ........................................................ 451 
A. Overview of the Global Issue of Visual 
Impairment ............................................................. 451 
1. The Economic Impact of Visual Impairment... 453 
2. The Disproportionate Burden Borne by 
LDCs and the Paradoxical Persistence of 
Treatable Visual Impairment in Developed 
Countries .......................................................... 454 
B. VIP Rights under Human Rights Treaties .............. 456 
1. The ICESCR and the ICCPR ........................... 457 
2. The CRPD ........................................................ 459 
                                                 
 1 James Love, Fordham Eighteenth Annual IP Conference, Session 8, Part A: 
Trade/Copyright: IP Trade Policy; WIPO Treaty for the Blind 16 (Apr. 9, 2010) 
[hereinafter Love, Fordham Conference] (transcript on file with author).  A ―treaty for the 
blind‖ is the most commonly used reference to the current discussions at the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) on a potential treaty mandating national 
copyright exemptions for VIPs.  This Note similarly employs that phrase as the standard 
reference to the object of these discussions. 
 J.D. Candidate, 2012, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2005, University of 
California-Berkeley.  I would like to thank Anne Kelsey for suggesting this topic; my 
advisor, Professor Hugh Hansen, for his guidance and advice; Professor Katherine 
Hughes, Professor Greg Milne and the participants of the Fall 2010 Leitner Advanced 
Topics in Human Rights seminar for their input; and the editors and staff of the Fordham 
Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal for their editing, support and 
patience.  
SCHEINWALD.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2012  5:13 PM 
446 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 22:445 
C. VIP Rights under Multilateral Copyright 
Treaties .................................................................. 463 
1. VIP-Oriented Copyright Exceptions Under 
the Berne Convention ...................................... 463 
2. VIP-Oriented Public-Interest Exceptions 
Under the Rome Convention ........................... 465 
3. VIP-Oriented Public-Interest Exceptions 
Under the WCT and WPPT ............................. 466 
D. The WIPO Standing Committee on Copyright 
and Related Rights’ Debate on Copyright-
Exemptions Treaty for VIPs ................................... 468 
1. WIPO SCCR Treaty Negotiations in Brief: 
November 2004 to December 201 ................... 468 
II. SHOULD THERE BE A MULTILATERAL VIP 
COPYRIGHT EXEMPTIONS TREATY? .............................. 474 
A. Arguments for a WIPO Copyright-Exemption 
Treaty for VIP Information-Access Rights ............. 474 
1. Human Rights-Based Concerns ....................... 474 
a) States Have Not Acted Sufficiently to 
Provide VIPs With Meaningful Access to 
Information ................................................ 474 
b) The Optional Protocol to the CRPD Does 
Not Sufficiently Encourage Cross-Border 
Information Sharing ................................... 477 
2. Arguments about Economic Efficiency ........... 481 
a) States and NGOs Waste Significant 
Resources in Multiplicative Efforts to 
Provide Materials in VIP-Accessible 
Formats ...................................................... 481 
3. Arguments About Conflicts Between Legal 
Paradigms ......................................................... 485 
a) Broad Consensus Supports Berne‘s 
Three-Step Test and Prohibition Against 
Broader Copyright Exemptions ................. 485 
4. Arguments about Practical Political 
Concerns .......................................................... 487 
a) Public and Private Entities Perceive the 
Treaty as a ―Gateway Drug‖ to Global-
Scale Copyright Infringements .................. 487 
SCHEINWALD.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2012  5:13 PM 
2012] A TREATY FOR THE BLIND? 447 
B. Arguments Against a WIPO Copyright-
Exemption Treaty for VIP Information Access 
Rights ..................................................................... 490 
1. Arguments about Human Rights-Based 
Concerns .......................................................... 490 
a) An Irreconcilable Conflict Between IP 
Rights-Holders and VIPs Precludes the 
Desired Mandatory Copyright 
Exemptions ................................................ 490 
b) The Treaty for the Blind Embodies 
Rights-Based Rather than Rights-
Infringing Treaty Exemptions .................... 497 
2. Arguments about Economic Efficiency ........... 498 
a) Copyright Exemptions Will Drive 
Further Global Piracy and Loss of Profits . 499 
3. Arguments about Conflicts Between Legal 
Paradigms ......................................................... 501 
a) Exemptions Subvert the Dominant Trend 
in Copyright Law and the History of 
International Human Rights Law ............... 501 
4. Arguments about Practical Political 
Concerns .......................................................... 503 
a) A Treaty Is Premature Because Many 
Nations Lack Sufficient Negotiating 
Resources and Expertise ............................ 503 
b) A Treaty Would Waste Valuable 
Political Capital on Rights That are Not 
as Important to Developing States ............. 505 
III. YES, THERE SHOULD BE A TREATY FOR THE BLIND: 
WHY THE WIPO SCCR SHOULD RECOGNIZE THE 
HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL IP COMMUNITY VIS-A-VIS VIP 
RIGHTS ......................................................................... 507 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 511 
 
SCHEINWALD.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2012  5:13 PM 
448 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 22:445 
INTRODUCTION 
The world is in the midst of a book famine.
2
  This famine, 
unlike many, is not exclusive to less-developed countries (LDCs), 
although the famine weighs most heavily on them.  Nor is it 
exclusive to impoverished persons, though one might reasonably 
surmise that if any population group were to suffer from a lack of 
access to information and enabling technologies, it would be the 
world‘s poor.  Rather, the global book famine is a condition 
exclusive to visually impaired persons.  Somewhat ironically, one 
might call them VIPs.  For the purposes of this Note, a VIP is 
anyone who, due to an accident of birth, aging or other natural 
factors, has a moderate to complete visual impairment that renders 
him or her unable to read standard-print text.
3
  Even a VIP who 
otherwise is fortunate enough to live in a developed country with a 
high standard of living has, at best, only one out of every twenty 
                                                 
 2 Dr. William Rowland, the President of the World Blind Union (WBU), has most 
notably used the phrase.  See Dr. William Rowland, WBU President, Address on the 
Occasion of WBU‘s Press Conference Launching the WBU Global Right to Read 
Campaign (Apr. 23, 2008), available at g3ict.com/download/p/fileId_783/productId_124. 
 3 The entire point of the treaty, after all, is to help VIPs ―who are unable to read 
copyright works in the form in which they are published,‖ these forms being commonly 
referred to as ―standard-print texts.‖ WIPO, Standing Committee on Copyright and 
Related Rights, 15th Sess., Sept. 11–13, 2006, Study on Copyright Limitations and 
Exceptions for the Visually Impaired, at 14, SCCR/15/7 (Feb. 20, 2007) (by Judith 
Sullivan), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_15/ 
sccr_15_7.pdf [hereinafter Sullivan Study]. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION (CDC), BUILDING A BASIS FOR ACTION: ENHANCING PUBLIC HEALTH 
SURVEILLANCE OF VISUAL IMPAIRMENT AND EYE HEALTH IN THE US 17, 36–38 (2011), 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/visionhealth/pdf/surveillance_background.pdf (tying 
VIP status to measurements of not only the underlying disease and visual acuity, but also 
―its effect on the individual (e.g., ability to perform daily activities like reading the 
newspaper),‖); World Health Organization (WHO), Visual Impairment and Blindness, 
WHO.INT, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs282/en/index.html (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2011) (referencing the 10th revision of the WHO International Statistical 
Classification of Diseases, Injuries and Causes of Death (ICD-10) and its four levels of 
visual function—‖normal vision,‖ ―moderate visual impairment,‖ ―severe visual 
impairment,‖ and ―blindness‖—thereby creating a definition of VIP as anyone whose 
impairment falls between moderate impairment to blindness); see also WHO, VISION 
2020 THE RIGHT TO SIGHT GLOBAL INITIATIVE FOR THE ELIMINATION OF AVOIDABLE 
BLINDNESS: ACTION PLAN 2006–2011 18 (2007), available at 
http://www.who.int/blindness/Vision2020_report.pdf [hereinafter Vision 2020 Report]. 
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books available to him or her.
4
  If a VIP lives in an LDC—a 
circumstance which itself correlates with higher rates of visual 




Responding to this famine, community and national leaders 
have stated that the problem of VIP access to information is acute, 
the obligation to remedy this human rights violation clear, and the 
need for a solution apparent.
6
  Since the publication of studies for 
the United Nations (UN) and World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) in 1982 and 1985, international leadership 
has effectively joined the chorus, stating that a treaty giving VIPs 




So, if broad political support exists for a solution to a fairly 
straightforward human rights issue and significant members of the 
international community have endorsed a VIP copyright-
exemptions treaty as the best means to that solution, why is there 
no treaty?  Who could possibly be against a treaty for the blind?  
As it turns out, many parties are against such a treaty.  The 
Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights (SCCR), the 
arm of the WIPO tasked with drafting an agreement for VIP access 
                                                 
 4 Sullivan Study, supra note 3, at 14 (―A figure widely quoted as the proportion of 
books published that are currently available in alternative formats useable by visually 
impaired people is no more than about 5%.‖); see also WIPO, Standing Committee on 
Copyright and Related Rights (SCCR), 19th Sess., Dec. 14–18, 2009, Background Paper 
by Brazil, Ecuador and Paraguay on a WIPO Treaty for Improved Access for Blind, 
Visually Impaired and Other Reading Disabled Persons, at Annex 1, SCCR/19/13 Corr., 
(Dec. 11, 2009), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/ 
en/sccr_19/sccr_19_13.pdf (stating that only 5 percent, or 2,000, of the 40,000 books 
published in the Netherlands in 2000 were translated into a VIP-appropriate format). 
 5 Sullivan Study, supra note 3, at 14. 
 6 See James Love, United States of America Statement on Copyright Exceptions and 
Limitations for Persons with Print Disabilities, Statement at WIPO, Standing Committee 
on Copyright and Related Rights, 19th Sess. (Dec. 15, 2009), available at 
http://keionline.org/node/723 (stating that the ―[United States is] also committed to 
policies that ensure everyone has a chance to get the information and education they need 
and to live independently as full citizens in their communities‖). 
 7 See United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
and WIPO, Application of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Property and the Universal Copyright Convention to Material for the Visually 
and Auditory Handicapped, UNESCO/WIPO/WGH/I/2 (Aug. 1982), at 4, available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0005/000507/050758eb.pdf. 
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to information in useable formats and technologies, began formally 
debating this issue in November 2008,
8
 although less-formal 
SCCR discussions have transpired since 2004.
9
  No agreement has 
yet been reached. 
This Note presents the history of the problem of VIPs‘ 
restricted access to information, a legal-realist analysis of the 
reasons for and against a WIPO treaty for the blind,
10
 and the 
contours of a best-case solution.  Part I discusses the background 
of the debate—from the basics of visual impairment to the 
responses and attempted action from world organizations.  Part II 
explains and analyzes the arguments for and against a WIPO treaty 
according to three categories: human-rights arguments, economic 
arguments, and political/legal realist arguments.  Responding to the 
concerns of Part I and the arguments of Part II, Part III proposes 
different solution, namely that a new international IP treaty, rather 
than a model law or consensus instrument or joint 
recommendation, is the optimal solution to the problem of VIP 
information access. 
                                                 
 8 See WIPO, Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights, 17th Sess., Nov. 
3–7, 2008, Draft Agenda, SCCR/17/1 (Sept. 1, 2008), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_17/sccr_17_1.pdf (mentioning, for 
the first time, an SCCR session agenda item regarding exemptions); see also James 
Pooley, Fordham Eighteenth International IP Conference, Sess. 8, Part A: 
Trade/Copyright: IP Trade Policy; WIPO Treaty for the Blind 5 (Apr. 9, 2010) 
[hereinafter Pooley, Fordham Conference] (transcript on file with author). 
 9 SILKE VON LEWINSKI, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND POLICY 22.15 (2008). 
 10 This Note refers most frequently to the potential treaty for copyright ―limitations and 
exceptions‖ (the phrase used by the WIPO SCCR Secretariat) for VIPs as a ―VIP 
copyright exemptions‖ treaty.  Commentators and negotiators often refer to a potential 
treaty as a (WIPO) ―treaty for the blind,‖ and this Note also occasionally employs that 
phrase. 
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I. WHAT ARE VIPS AND HOW DOES THEIR CURRENT STATUS 
PRESENT A HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEM?  AN EPIDEMIOLOGY AND A 
HISTORY OF NATIONAL AND GLOBAL SOLUTIONS TO THE VIP 
INFORMATION-ACCESS PROBLEM 
A. Overview of the Global Issue of Visual Impairment 
The World Health Organization (WHO) approximates the 
global VIP population at 285 million persons,
11
 the vast majority 
of whom suffer from a reduction, not a loss, of visual perception.
12 
 
Almost ninety percent of VIPs live in LDCs, disproportionately 
burdening these countries with the cost of medical care, financial 
support, and other services.
13
 
For the purposes of this Note, it is important to distinguish 
between treatable and untreatable causes of visual impairment.  
Broadly, a treatable cause of visual impairment is any cause that is 
readily avoidable through the provision of basic preventative 
services, including simple procedures such as fitting a VIP for 
glasses and more expensive and complex—but ultimately cost-
effective
14—procedures such as cataract surgery.15  The WHO 
                                                 
 11 See WHO, Visual Impairment and Blindness, WHO.INT, http://www.who.int/media 
centre/factsheets/fs282/en/index.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2011) [hereinafter WHO Fact 
Sheet]. 
 12 See id. 
 13 Id.; infra Part A.1.  Of course, while the WHO Vision 2020 initiative and increased 
national efforts have produced many successes in reducing the population of treatable 
VIPs, it should be noted the provision of medical care, financial support and other 
services is generally minimal to non-existent in many LDCs. Vision 2020 Report, supra 
note 3, at 7 also explains:  
As the prevalence of noncommunicable chronic eye diseases 
continues to grow substantially, global disparities in the availability 
of eye health-care services will continue to obstruct the prevention 
and control of avoidable blindness and low vision in the most 
populated, poorest parts of the world.  To these challenges must be 
added the entrenched disparities in the allocation and availability of 
human and financial resources.  Without the resources needed to 
implement national VISION 2020 plans for the prevention of 
blindness, there is a real danger that the momentum that has been 
built to eliminate avoidable blindness will be lost . . . . 
Id.  
 14 See generally Rob Baltussen et al., Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Cataract Surgery: 
A Global and Regional Analysis, 85 BULL. OF THE WHO 338 (May 2004), available at 
http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/82/5/338.pdf. 
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estimates the population of persons whose visual impairment is 
readily avoidable—the treatable population of VIPs—at 
approximately 228 million, or slightly less than four percent of the 
world‘s 2009 population.16  The vast majority of VIPs with a 
treatable condition live in LDCs.
17
 
The treatable population is the focus of the WIPO treaty for the 
blind and this Note.  Much like other preventable diseases and 
conditions, the existence of such a significant and widespread 
population of VIPs kept separated from the written word is a 
human rights violation.
18
  Given the predominance of VIPs in 
LDCs and the predominance of copyright holders who can provide 
VIPs with appropriately formatted materials in developed 
countries, the issue of VIP information access is also a classic issue 
of access to resources: developed, Northern Hemisphere nations 
                                                                                                             
 15 See id.; see also WHO, What is Refractive Error?, WHO.INT (May 18, 2009), 
http://www.who.int/features/qa/45/en/index.html. 
 16 See WHO Fact Sheet, supra note 11 (noting that 285 million people are visually 
impaired worldwide, that eighty percent of impairment is avoidable or treatable, and that 
approximately ninety percent of VIPs live in LDCs). 
 17 Id.  It is also significant for the purposes of this Note that beyond the effect of 
improved data gathering, the process of economic development has in LDCs across the 
globe increased the lifespans of many persons. See Vision 2020 Report, supra note 3, at 
5.  Increased lifespans have effectively reduced the incidence of blindness, emphasizing 
in turn the significance of age-related causes of visual impairment, such as diabetic 
retinopathy, glaucoma and age-related macular degeneration.  These treatable causes 
drive an extremely high incidence of visual impairment among older persons: despite 
representing only nineteen percent of the world‘s population, they comprise over eighty 
percent of VIPs. See WHO Fact Sheet, supra note 11 and accompanying text.  The 
WHO‘s Vision 2020 initiative, which is aimed at eradicating avoidable (alternatively 
phrased, treatable) visual impairment, should further increase the significance of age-
related causes of visual impairment. See Vision 2020 Report, supra note 3, at 53–60 
(outlining initiatives and programs aimed at reducing global visual impairment 
incidence).  It should be noted at this point that given the human rights involved in VIP 
information access, the breadth of activities engaged in by older persons, and in particular 
the continued participation of older persons in political and cultural activities, this shift 
has no bearing on the pro-treaty arguments presented in this Note.  An additional 
consideration in discussing visual impairment on a global scale is that women are 
disproportionately at risk for some form of impairment, irrespective of nationality or age.  
See id. 
 18 See infra Part I.B. 
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1. The Economic Impact of Visual Impairment 
Beyond human rights, treatable causes of visual impairment are 
significant because of their economic cost.  While few studies exist 
on the economic loss associated with visual disability, one study 
conducted by Australia in 2004, estimated that visual impairment 
resulted in a net loss to the country of A$3.2 billion.
20
  This study 
is significant because, while Australia is a developed country, 
approximately seventy-five percent of the VIPs in that nation 
suffer from at least one of five preventable conditions.
21
  Further, 
global estimates place the current cost of reduced productivity due 
to VIP status at almost $75 billion; this figure notably excludes the 
collective cost savings to all nations of health care, medical 
equipment and welfare payments that they currently provide to 
VIPs.
22
  The proportional costs of treating visual impairment and 
the resultant net benefit to the state indicate that at least LDCs, 
                                                 
 19 See generally SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS: NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST (1998) (discussing the significance of the 
divide between the North-South intellectual property regimes).  A somewhat cynical take 
on what this difference means for global politics and human rights is that ―there is no 
international intellectual property law per se; instead intellectual property rights are 
subject to the principle of territoriality‖ and ―vary according to what each state 
recognizes and enforces.‖ Laurence R. Helfer, International Rights Approaches to 
Intellectual Property: Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, 40 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971, 980 (2007) (citing Andrea Morgan, Comment, TRIPS to 
Thailand: The Act for the Establishment of and Procedure for Intellectual Property and 
International Trade Court, 23 FORDHAM INT‘L L.J. 795, 796 (2000)).  Of course, 
regardless of how the conflict is cast, because the VIP information-access problem is 
acute in both the North and South, a WIPO copyright-exemptions treaty will provide 
those with untreatable visual impairment, and in particular blind persons, with equally 
improved access to books and materials, regardless of where they live.  
 20 ACCESS ECONOMICS PTY. LTD., CENTER FOR EYE RESEARCH AUSTRALIA, CLEAR 
INSIGHT: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT AND COST OF VISION LOSS IN AUSTRALIA 6 (2004) 
[hereinafter CERA], available at http://www.cera.org.au/uploads/CERA_clearinsight.pdf.  
 21 Id. at 5.  These conditions are cataracts, age-related macular degeneration, 
glaucoma, diabetic retinopathy and refractive errors. 
 22 Vision 2020 Report, supra note 3, at 7–8 (including Figure 6) (citing Kevin D. Frick 
and Allen Foster, The Magnitude and Cost of Global Blindness: An Increasing Problem 
That Can Be Alleviated, 135 AM. J. OF OPHTHALMOLOGY 471, 471–76 (2003)). 
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2. The Disproportionate Burden Borne by LDCs and the 
Paradoxical Persistence of Treatable Visual Impairment in 
Developed Countries 
It is important to underscore how VIPs disproportionately 
affect LDCs.  The existence of such a high incidence of VIPs 
globally is a function of the existence and sustainment of treatable 
conditions such as cataracts, glaucoma, corneal diseases, and 
diabetes
24
 in these states.
25
  Approximately 90 percent of VIPs live 
in LDCs.
26
  This figure roughly correlates with the WHO‘s 




Visual impairment is also one of the diseases or conditions that 
causes the most impact.  The standard of measurement for the 
impact of a disease or condition is disability-adjusted life years 
(DALYs), which measures the composite years impacted by a 
                                                 
 23 Australia‘s economically reasonable position, for example, would be to treat all 
preventable cases of visual impairment.   
 24 WHO, Main Causes of Visual Impairment, WHO.INT (Oct. 7, 2010), 
http://www.who.int/blindness/causes/priority/en/index.html (providing links to the 
referenced diseases and conditions and their definitions).  
 25 Cataracts are, in fact, the leading cause of treatable visual impairment globally, but 
at the national level, cataracts are a leading cause of treatable visual impairment only in 
poorer countries. Vision 2020 Report, supra note 3, at 4 (Figure 1); WHO Fact Sheet, 
supra note 11.  In developed nations, advanced medical care has rendered cataracts a 
source of visual impairment and DALYs virtually non-existent: for the United States, 
2004 data on the VIP population estimated the combined incidence of blindness and low 
vision at 0.78% and 1.98%, respectively, for a combined VIP incidence of 2.6%. Nathan 
Congdon, et al., Causes and Prevalence of Visual Impairment Among Adults in the 
United States, 122 ARCH. OF OPHTHALMOLOGY 477, 477 (2004).  However, some 
researchers believe that, in addition to the availability of medical and professional 
services, cultural norms regarding medical care, particularly preventative medical care, 
can play a role in the persistence of visual impairment.  The presence of cultural norms 
may help explain, as is discussed in subsequent pages of this Note, the comparatively 
high incidence rates of visual impairment in many developed nations. See Serge 
Resnikoff et al., Global Magnitude of Visual Impairment Caused by Uncorrected 
Refractive Errors in 2004, 84 BULL. OF THE WHO 63, 67–68 (2004), available at 
http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/86/1/07-041210.pdf [hereinafter Resnikoff]. 
 26 WHO Fact Sheet, supra note 11.  
 27 Id. 
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disability or disease and years lost due to premature death.
28
  
Visual impairment is behind only the most acute global health 




One might infer from the severe disproportionality of VIPs in 
LDCs and the wealth and health care systems that developed 
nations possess that developed nations have a below-average 
incidence of visual impairment.  Substantial data, however, 
indicate the contrary.  A nation‘s comparative wealth guarantees 
neither that the incidence of visual impairment of its population is 
acceptable according to the WHO Visual 2020 goals,
30
 nor that 
VIPs in that nation have sufficient access to reading materials.
31
 
The WHO‘s analysis of national surveys has compared the 
incidence of VIPs in developed nations such as the United States, 
Italy and Ireland with developing countries.  Although developed 
countries in the aggregate may have a lower incidence rate of 
treatable visual impairment than LDCs, when considered 
individually, the developed countries have greater rates of visual 
impairment due to uncorrected refractive errors (myopia, 
hyperopia and astigmatism, all treatable causes of visual 
impairment) than those of countries such as Guatemala, South 
Africa and Iran.
32
  Further, some of the lowest incidence rates in 
the WHO global sub-regions studies occurred in regions composed 
of mostly or exclusively LDCs.
33
  The lowest incidence of 
correctable refractive errors for the five to forty-nine year-old age 
groups, for instance, was in three African nations.
34
 
                                                 
 28 Vision 2020 Report, supra note 3, at 6.  The DALY measurement is useful because 
it provides a basis for comparing the impact of diseases and conditions, which are 
otherwise highly dissimilar. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 53. 
 31 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing how even in developed nations, 
only five percent of written works published in a year are translated into VIP-accessible 
formats). 
 32 Resnikoff, supra note 25, at Table 1.   
 33 See id., Table 1 for a list of the WHO sub-regions for which data was gathered. 
 34 Id. Table 2.        
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In sum, visual impairment is a global issue in its depth and 
scope.  It weighs most heavily on LDCs, where individuals do not 
have access to preventative measures and treatment therapies that 
limit or eliminate visual impairment.  But whatever the national 
and global causes and the potential solutions, those who suffer 
from treatable visual impairment are found in every nation.  Visual 
impairment is thus a global problem in every sense of the term: it 
affects all persons, regardless of nationality, ethnicity, age or 
gender. 
B. VIP Rights under Human Rights Treaties 
Through human rights treaties, nations have sought to curb the 
consequences of visual impairment.  Specific obligations to enable 
VIPs to access information have moved from early statements of 
general principles, such as in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR),
35
 to the more concrete statements in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), and finally to the current and highly specific 
protections of disability rights under the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), passed in 2006.  These 
treaties and the rights they create, in particular the rights found in 
the CRPD, support the right of VIPs as persons with disabilities to 
access educational, cultural, political, and employment 
information.  It follows that the failure of states to facilitate this 
                                                 
 35 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 19, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].  Ratified in 1948 and considered to be 
one of the founding documents of modern international law, the UDHR contains several 
provisions that can be interpreted to convey VIP rights to materials and technologies. 
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, Implementation of General Assembly 
Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 Entitled “Human Rights Council”: The Right to 
Education of Persons with Disabilities, 4th Session, A/HRC/4/29 (Feb. 19, 2007), ¶¶ 27–
34 [hereinafter Special Rapporteur Report] (describing state obligations according to the 
provisions of the CRPD).  Article 19 includes a right, beyond freedom of thought and 
expression, ―to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and 
regardless of frontiers.‖ UDHR, supra.  Similarly, but with respect exclusively to cultural 
matters, all persons have ―the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the 
community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.‖ Id. 
art. 27(1).  Most broadly, under Article 26(1), ―[e]veryone has the right to education.‖ Id. 
art. 26(1).   
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access is a human rights violation, though it is also true that 
treaties themselves do not do enough to protect VIP rights.
36
 
1. The ICESCR and the ICCPR 
Ratified in 1966, the ICESCR
37
 creates concrete legal rights 
out of the principles expressed in the UDHR.  The ICESCR 
provides specific rights and clarifications of rights with respect to 
information access and the right to education, and indirectly 
addresses the rights to meaningfully participate in cultural 
activities and political life, enjoy an adequate standard of living 
through employment and employment advancement, and benefit 
from technological and scientific advancements.
38
 
In contrast to the UDHR‘s general principle that states should 
make education available to their citizens,
39
 the ICESCR obligates 
states to create ―[s]econdary education in its different forms, 
including technical and vocational secondary education, [and make 
it] generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate 
means.‖40  The ICESCR clarifies the right to education by defining 
                                                 
 36 Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 35, ¶¶ 16–21.  Also relevant to this section is 
the question of interpretation.  That there are multiple interpretive methods for a legal 
text such as a treaty is both an obvious and a contentious point. John Tobin, Seeking to 
Persuade: A Constructive Approach to Human Rights Treaty Interpretation, 23 HARV. 
HUM. RTS. J. 1, 6–7, 13–14 (2010) (reviewing some of the interpretive approaches to 
treaties, including the formalist, historical, sociological and constructive approaches).  
Tobin also notes that the common interpretation methodology is Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which advocates for an ―ordinary meaning‖ standard 
based on the treaty text‘s context and the treaty‘s overall purpose. See id. at 2; United 
Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), arts. 31(2)-(3) and 32, 1155 
U.N. 331, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/ 
conventions/1_1_1969.pdf.  
 37 ICESCR, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 38 Id. art. 13(1). 
 39 See UDHR, supra note 35, art. 19. 
 40 ICESCR, supra note 37, art. 13(2)(b) (emphasis added).  It is true that this second 
right is not a right to compulsory education, or what the UDHR and the ICESCR call 
―fundamental‖ and ―primary‖ education. See UDHR, supra note 35, art. 26(1).  However, 
the ICESCR text is written in such a way as to create an obligation to states that offer 
secondary and higher education to do so in a manner that makes materials available to all 
those who need it. ICESCR, supra note 37, art. 13(2)(b-c).  Thus, if secondary and higher 
education is now available in a given nation, the ICESCR is a clear positive assertion of 
the right of all persons in that nation to have access to educational materials in 
appropriate formats. 
SCHEINWALD.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2012  5:13 PM 
458 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 22:445 
the purpose of the right to education as ―enabl[ing] all persons to 
participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding, 
tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or 
religious groups, and further the activities of the United Nations 
for the maintenance of peace.‖41  Along with the ICCPR,42 the 
right of all persons to ―participate in a free society‖ creates for 
VIPs, as much as another person, a right to access the information 




However, the ICESCR fails to extend certain rights to VIPs.  
For example, the ICESCR protects an individual‘s right to work.44  
The realization of this right ―include[s] technical and vocational 
guidance and training programmes, policies and techniques to 
achieve steady economic, social and cultural development and full 
and productive employment under conditions safeguarding 
fundamental political and economic freedoms to the individual.‖45  
However, neither scholars nor international organizations appear to 
have argued that this provision, coupled with the ICESCR anti-
discrimination provision,
46
 creates a positive obligation for states 
to provide VIPs with information access relating to work.  
Similarly, while the ICESCR ties together economic, social and 
cultural rights with the right of all to ―enjoy the benefits of 
                                                 
 41 ICESCR, supra note 37, art. 13(1). 
 42 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1996, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (respectively asserting that ―[e]veryone shall have the right to 
freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in 
print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice,‖ and that ―[e]very 
citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned 
in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: (a) [t]o take part in the conduct of 
public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives.‖).  The ICCPR was 
passed in the same resolution as the ICESCR. ICESCR, supra note 37. 
 43 Id. art. 19(2). 
 44 ICESCR, supra note 37, art. 6(1). 
 45 Id. art. 6(2). 
 46 Id. art. 2(2) (―The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that 
the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of 
any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status.‖).  Disability would therefore be covered 
under the ―other status‖ protections. 
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scientific progress and its applications,‖47 the content of this right 
is contentious.
48
  Therefore, an argument for the advancement of 
an information-access right for VIPs based exclusively on this 
article would likely be contested or disregarded.
49
 
2. The CRPD 
Adopted in 2005, the CRPD
50
 is by far the most explicit 
protection of individual rights and is the foundational international 
                                                 
 47 Id. art. 15(1)(b). 
 48 Most notably, in the context of the right to access anti-retroviral therapy (commonly 
known as ARV) as part of rights to medicine and the highest attainable standard of 
health, international law scholars, national leaders and pharmaceutical companies 
vehemently disagree about the content and scope of these rights. Contrast HOLGER 
HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE CASE OF PATENTS AND ACCESS TO 
MEDICINES 102–07, 112 (2007) [hereinafter HESTERMEYER] (discussing the foundation of 
the right to health, ICESCR Article 12, and the supporting Article 15, and noting that 
according to the UN and international human rights law scholars, the right is in fact the 
highest standard of health one can attain, subject only to state resources and the limitation 
of supporting economic and social rights such as food and housing), with id. at 11–17 
(discussing the actions of the United States through the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and pharmaceutical companies in applying political and economic pressure 
against nations such as India and Brazil, which pushed back on the tightened intellectual 
property protections of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(TRIPs)).  One of the more noteworthy stories in this regard is the actions of Canada and 
the United States following the September 11th terrorist attacks and the October 2001 
anthrax scare. See id. at 15–17.  
 49 In addition, the immediately following subsection presents a limiting principle to 
this right, namely, that individuals have the right to ―benefit from the protection of the 
moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production‖ 
that they author. ICESCR, supra note 37, art. 15(1)(c).  Thus, even though the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (―CESCR‖), the treaty-administering body for 
the ICESCR, has stated that access to at least life-saving medicines is a human right and 
human rights law commentators have made arguments for a right to medicine as a 
customary law, this right is generally unsupported among nations. CESCR, General 
Comment No. 14: Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ¶ 12(a), U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/2000/4 
(Aug. 11, 2000) [hereinafter General Comment No. 14], available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28symbol%29/E.C.12.2000.4.En (noting that States 
Party must have ―[f]unctioning public health and health-care facilities, goods and 
services,‖ which with respect to medicines includes ―essential drugs, as defined by the 
WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs‖) (emphasis added); HESTERMEYER, supra 
note 48, at 122–34 (reviewing arguments for and against the presence of state practice 
and opinio juris supporting an international customary law of a right to medicine). 
 50 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 
3 [hereinafter CRPD]. 
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human rights treaty for VIPs.  The CRPD treats VIPs as a category 
of persons with disabilities and creates explicit and more detailed 
rights to access information.  First, the CRPD advances VIP rights 
through specific and inclusive definitions of terms, including 
―appropriate formats and technologies‖51 and ―communication.‖52  
For example, the CRPD defines ―communication‖ as ―includ[ing] 
languages, display of text, Braille, tactile communication, large 
print, accessible multimedia as well as written, audio, plain-
language, human-reader and augmentative and alternative modes, 
means and formats of communication, including accessible 
information and communication technology. . . .‖53  These 
definitions are employed to create broad and explicit protections of 
VIP rights to the three spheres of activity outlined in the ICCPR 
and ICESCR—cultural participation, political participation and 
educational access—and the right to work and access to 
information required for those activities.
54
 
Regarding education, the CRPD directs states to go beyond 
previous treaty-based obligations to ensure that tertiary education 
is accessible to persons with disabilities,
55
 that persons with 
disabilities receive education from teachers who can instruct in 
appropriate formats,
56
 and that instruction for persons with 
disabilities is conducted in the ―most appropriate languages and 
modes and means of communication for the individual.‖57  As 
compared to the protections of the ICESCR, the CRPD provides 
detailed benchmarks for ensuring that those countries party to the 
                                                 
 51 See, e.g., id. art. 21(a)–(b) (listing ―use of sign languages, Braille, augmentative and 
alternative communication, and all other accessible means, modes and formats of 
communication of their choice by persons with disabilities in official interactions‖ as 
―accessible formats and technologies appropriate to different kinds of disabilities‖). 
 52 Id. art. 2. 
 53 Id. 
54 E.g., ICESCR, supra note 37, art. 9 (recognizing ―the right of everyone to social 
security, including social insurance‖); ICCPR, supra note 42, art. 17(1) (recognizing that 
―[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, 
home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.‖); Janet E. 
Lord et al., Lessons from the Experience of U.N. Covention on the Rights of Persons With 
Disabilities: Addressing the Democratic Deficit in Global Health Governance, 38 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 564, 571–72 (2011).  
 55 CRPD, supra note 50, art. 24(5). 
 56 Id. art. 24(4). 
 57 Id. art. 24(3)(c).   
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treaty realize VIP rights
58
 and creates additional compliance 
requirements for those countries. 
Moreover, with respect to poilitical, cultural and 
national/community life, the CRPD echoes the ICCPR in generally 
protecting for all persons ―the freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas on an equal basis with others and through all 
forms of communication of their choice. . . .‖59  The CRPD then 
broadens and further concretizes the rights provided in the 
ICESCR and ICCPR.  Article 21(b), for example, spells out 
formats and technologies to which disabled persons have a right to 
access in order to participate in political life.
60
  Article 21(b) also 
substantially increases the state compliance standard.
61
  The CRPD 
further provides robust descriptions of VIP cultural rights, 
requiring that ―cultural materials,‖ like ―television programmes, 
films, theatre and other cultural activities,‖ and ―cultural 
performances or services, such as theatres, museums, cinemas, 
libraries and tourism services‖ be accessible to VIPs.62 
Lastly, the right to work, a right referred to in the ICESCR but 
not strongly linked to VIP rights, is explicitly tied to the rights of 
persons with disabilities in the CRPD.  Specifically with respect to 
VIP information access rights, the CRPD obligates states to 
promote the realization of the right to work . . . by 
taking appropriate steps, including through 
legislation, to, inter alia: 
 (a) Prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
disability with regard to all matters concerning all 
forms of employment, including conditions of 
recruitment, hiring and employment, continuance of 
                                                 
 58 Lord et al., supra note 54, at 571–72 (discussing the comparatively specific 
protections of the CRPD). 
 59 CRPD, supra note 50, art. 21. 
 60 Id. art. 21(b). 
 61 The CRPD expands the direct object of those rights in Article 28, creating state 
obligations to provide persons with disabilities access to several aspects of political life, 
including participation in elections, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and 
support and advocacy groups for persons with disabilities. Id. arts. 28, 29(a)(1) and 
(b)(2). 
 62 Id. art. 30. 
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employment, career advancement and safe and 
healthy working conditions; . . . 
 (d) Enable persons with disabilities to have 
effective access to general technical and vocational 
guidance programmes, placement services and 
vocational and continuing training; . . . and 
  (i) Ensure that reasonable 
accommodation is provided to persons with 
disabilities in the workplace; . . . .
63
 
These rights, while not referencing ―communication,‖ 
nonetheless suggest that states must provide appropriate-format 
training and employment materials to VIPs. 
The specificity of these CRPD obligations is significant 
because it both makes avoidance of implementation on grounds of 
vagueness difficult to justify, and because it stands as a barrier to 
one of the arguments against a WIPO copyright-exemption treaty 
for VIPs: namely, that vaguely phrased obligations in the 




                                                 
 63 Id. 
 64 See infra pp. 54–55 (describing the ―thin edge of the wedge‖ argument).  Further 
support for this conclusion comes from the Special Rapporteur on the right to education.  
Special Rapporteurs are individual-based mechanisms through which the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) monitors country-
specific or thematic human rights issues.  The Special Rapporteur on the right to 
education reported to the OHCHR in 2007 on the right of persons with disabilities to 
education.  Special Rapporteur recommendations are non-binding, but they provide states 
and interested parties with direction on how to fulfill treaty obligations, and are therefore 
useful in understanding the current status of specific human rights from the perspective of 
the international governmental organizations and the international human rights law 
community. See OHCHR, Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council (2010), 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/special/index.htm (last accessed Dec. 16, 
2010).  The emphasis of the Special Rapporteur‘s report is that states act according to the 
principle of ―inclusive education,‖ which eschews differentiation between education of 
disabled and non-disabled students; while not stated explicitly, implementing the 
principle of ―inclusive education‖ would also require significant conversion of school 
materials into VIP-accessible formats. Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 35, ¶¶ 81–
85.  
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C. VIP Rights under Multilateral Copyright Treaties 
Exemptions to copyrights are a primary means through which 
VIPs might obtain ready and affordable access to the reading 
materials rightfully available to them under human rights treaties.  
Multilateral international copyright treaties such as the Berne 
Convention,
65
 the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and other 
agreements all provide for such copyright exemptions.  These 
exemptions, however, are based on the three-step test originally 
stated in the Berne Convention and reiterated in every subsequent 
copyright treaty, including the most recent instruments, the 1996 




1. VIP-Oriented Copyright Exceptions Under the Berne 
Convention 
The 1967 Stockholm revision to the Berne Convention 
introduced to international copyright law the three-step test for 
exempting from illegality an otherwise rights-infringing 
reproduction of a person‘s work.67  Exemptions are granted if three 
factors are met: 
(1) There is a ―certain special case‖ or use 
                                                 
 65 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 
25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (last revised July 24, 1971) [hereinafter Berne 
Convention].  The Berne Convention, as noted in the following discussion of the three-
step test, has been frequently amended since its passage. 
 66 Some of the recent international IP treaties in which the three-step test appears are 
Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 1, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Apr. 15, 
1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-
trips.pdf [hereinafter TRIPs]; the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) of 1996 art. 10, Dec. 
20, 1996, WIPO WO033EN  [hereinafter WCT]; and the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty of 1996 (WPPT) art. 16, Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO WO034EN 
[hereinafter WPPT].  
 67 As Sullivan notes, the Berne Convention either does not contemplate or does not 
grant several rights that would be helpful in understanding and broadening VIP rights to 
information in the absence of a comprehensive WIPO treaty.  For example, there is no 
exemption for adaptation of a copyrighted work, which could prove useful in bringing 
works that would be difficult for VIPs to understand into a format that is more 
appropriate, and there is no exemption for distribution, which one can reasonably read 
into a right to reproduction, but which is nonetheless not explicitly provided for in the 
treaty. See Sullivan Study, supra note 3, at 17–19. 
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(2) that does not ―conflict with a normal 
exploitation of a work‖ and 
(3) that does not ―unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the author.‖68 
As Sullivan cautiously noted in reporting to WIPO on existing 
exemptions, a reading of the Berne Convention that provides 
sufficient production of materials to satisfy VIP needs ―seems 
possible, but it is likely to need careful drafting to comply with the 
conditions.‖69  Perhaps most significantly, Sullivan stated that an 
exemption for VIP rights would likely only work if the use under 
the exemption does not conflict with existing and potential future 
markets for the rights holder, or otherwise create economic 
competition with the rights holder.
70
  Recent cases have used the 
three-step test to give narrow interpretations to the realm of 
possible copyright violations, illustrating Sullivan‘s analysis.71  
Additionally, prominent holders of copyrights, or rights-holders, 
have strongly opposed non-market solutions, such as a treaty-based 
mandatory copyright exemption for VIPs, even where markets 
have failed to develop solutions in any meaningful way.
72
  Thus, 
                                                 
 68 Id. at 17 (quoting Berne Convention, supra note 65, art. 9(2)). 
 69 Id.  Additionally, approximately 60 states, such as the United States and its Chafee 
Amendment, do have national statutory exemptions that at least arguably comport with 
the three-step test. Sullivan Study, supra note 3, at 28–29. 
 70 Id. 
 71 See, e.g., Copiepresse v. Google, Inc., Tribunal de Premiere Instance [Civ.] 
[Tribunal of the First Instance], Bruxelles, Feb. 15, 2007, No. 06/10.928/C, Wansart 
Magerman (Belg.).  This footnote relies on the English translation.  Note that this case is 
decided under European Community Directive 2001/29/EC, which provides the exact 
same three-step test as the international IP agreements in harmonizing copyright law 
within the EC. Community Directive 2001/29/CE, art. 5.5, On the Harmonisation of 
Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2001 O.J. 
(L167) 10, 22 (―5.  The exceptions and limitations provided for in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 
4 shall only be applied in certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the work or other subject-matter and do not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the rightholder.‖).  The court noted that this test ―appears to be 
such as to confirm the restrictive nature of the exceptions,‖ and ultimately issued an 
injunction against Google‘s operation of its Google News service in Belgium because its 
publication via an accessible cache of plaintiff‘s articles did not fall within any of the 
three applicable exceptions (citation; press review; and citations for the purposes of 
critique, polemic, teaching, review or in scientific works and insofar as justified by the 
intended aim) in Belgian copyright law.  
 72 See, e.g., infra pp. 41–44 (discussing opposition to the WBU draft treaty introduced 
by Brazil to the WIPO SCCR in 2008). 
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neither the three-step test nor the Berne Convention have 
facilitated VIP information access. 
2. VIP-Oriented Public-Interest Exceptions Under the Rome 
Convention 
The Rome Convention, a 1980 treaty that protects performers, 
producers of phonograms and broadcasting organizations,
73
 
similarly offers limited opportunities for exempted use of 
copyrighted material to benefit VIPs.  The Rome Convention 
contains two types of exemption authority: specific exemption 
types enumerated in the treaty, and exemptions of ―the same kind‖ 
as those existing under a nation‘s domestic laws given to literary 
and other authorial works.
74
  Article 15(1) of the Rome Convention 
provides treaty-specific exemptions, allowing states to create 
national exemptions for four types of uses: private use, brief 
excerpted use for news reporting, ―ephemeral fixation‖ of 
broadcast organization material by that organization and for its 
own use only, and scientific and ―teaching‖ use.75  The latter three 
exceptions by their terms do not provide access for VIPs, and the 
―private use‖ exception suggests non-public use incompatible with 
general VIP access.
76
  Moreover, exemptions of ―the same kind‖ is 
                                                 
 73 International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms 
and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 12, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter Rome 
Convention].   While the Rome Convention obviously covers ―neighboring rights‖ to 
copyright rather than copyright itself, it is included because such works are as useful and 
desirable to VIPs as they are to anyone else, and these works would require the same 
level of conversion and distribution as a copyrighted work would. 
 74 Article 15(2) permits states to harmonize their national exemptions for the works 
covered under the Convention—performances, phonographic materials and broadcast-
organization works—with any existing national copyright exemptions for literary and 
artistic works.  See id. art. 15(2).  However, Article 3(1) of TRIPs supersedes 15(2) of the 
Rome Convention, and provides most-favored-nation status, i.e., a state cannot treat 
foreign persons worse than it treats its own citizens, to all persons with respect to 
administration and enforcement of their IP rights. TRIPs, supra note 66, art. 3(1); VON 
LEWINSKI, supra note 9, at 10.36.  Article 15(2) does not therefore add global copyright 
exemptions to Article 15(1), but rather only an exemption for any rights-holder in the 
world when dealing with national-level neighboring rights issues.   
 75 Rome Convention, supra note 73, art. 15(1). 
 76 See Sam Ricketson, WIPO Study on Limitations and Exemptions of Copyright and 
Related Rights in the Digital Environment 44-45, SCCR, SCCR/9/7 (Apr. 5, 2003), 
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_9/sccr_9_7.pdf. 
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essentially no more than a reference to Berne, as these works are 
covered under Berne and most nations are bound by that treaty.
77
 
3. VIP-Oriented Public-Interest Exceptions Under the WCT 
and WPPT 
Along with the WPPT, the WCT is the most recent 
international IP treaty.  Given the increasing importance of human 
rights protections in the years preceding ratification of the WPPT 
and WCT,
78
 it is at least feasible that these treaties could grant 
broader rights than the Berne or Rome Conventions.  However, the 
copyright exemption in both the WCT and the WPPT is none other 
than the three-step test from the Berne Convention.
79
 
The nesting of WCT copyright exemptions within the Berne 
Convention and its three-step test is readily demonstrable.  Article 
                                                 
 77 See id. at 46 (noting that private use ―is also a reference to the Berne Convention‖ 
because ―such domestic laws will, as a matter of principle, need to be consistent with the 
provisions of that Convention‖ given that ratification of the Rome Covention requires 
ratification of the Berne Convention, and that nearly all nations are members of the Berne 
Convention).  Contrast Sullivan Study, supra note 3, at 19–20 (discussing possible 
sources for VIP copyright exemptions in other Rome Convention articles while noting the 
overarching constraint imposed by the Berne Convention). 
 78 See, e.g., UNESCO and WIPO, Application of the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Property and the Universal Copyright Convention to 
Material for the Visually and Auditory Handicapped, UNESCO/WIPO/WGH/I/2 (1982), 
available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0005/000507/050758eb.pdf; W. M. Noel, 
Copyright Problems Raised by the Access by Handicapped Persons to Protected Works, 
Executive Committee of the International Union for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works (Berne Union), IGC(1971)/VI/11 (May 30, 1985), available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0006/000651/065169eb.pdf. 
 79 While beyond the scope of this Note, the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, commonly referred to as the TRIPs Agreement or simply 
TRIPs, also incorporates the three-step test of Berne.  TRIPs is noteworthy because it is 
the predominant trade agreement in international IP law discourse today and has been the 
source of bitter conflict, most notably in the global response to HIV/AIDS and LDC 
access to medicine.  The introductory article to TRIPs explicitly brings, among other 
intellectual property, copyright; trademark; performances, phonogram producers, and 
broadcast producers (i.e., the subject of the Rome Convention and the WPPT) into its 
ambit. See supra note 63 art. 3.  Just as with the Rome Convention, WPPT and other 
treaties, TRIPs then incorporates the Berne Convention less Article 6bis, which provides 
for the rights of IP creators. Id. art. 14(1).  Some scholars even argue that because Article 
9(1) of TRIPs states that the treaty is an agreement within Article 20 of the Berne 
Convention, there is absolutely no argument that TRIPs provides for any exceptions not 
contemplated within VON LEWINSKI, supra note 9, at 10.84 (citing DANIEL GERVAIS, THE 
TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS nn. 1.11–1.12 (2d ed.) (2003)). 
SCHEINWALD.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2012  5:13 PM 
2012] A TREATY FOR THE BLIND? 467 
1(4) of the WCT unequivocally states that ―[c]ontracting Parties 
shall comply with Articles 1 to 21 and the Appendix of the Berne 
Convention.‖80  Further, ―[t]he reproduction right, as set out in 
Article 9 of the Berne Convention, and the exceptions permitted 
thereunder, fully apply in the digital environment, in particular to 
the use of works in digital form.‖81  For reproduction, adaptation, 
distribution, and wireless communication rights then, the WCT 




The WPPT updates the copyright protections and limitations 
established in the Rome Convention.
83
  The WPPT differs from the 
WCT and many other international IP treaties in an important 
respect: it does not require compliance with the preceding treaty, in 
this case the Rome Convention.
84
  However, this does not improve 
the realization of VIP information-access rights, as the only 
                                                 
 80 WCT, supra note 66, art. 1(4). 
 81 Id. at note 2.  The endnotes to the WCT are ―agreed statements of the Diplomatic 
Conference that adopted the Treaty (WIPO Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright 
and Neighboring Rights Questions) concerning certain provisions of the WCT . . . .‖ Id. 
at note 1. 
 82 The WCT also covers several materials that were not in existence at the time of the 
Berne Convention.  Articles 4 and 5 of the WCT respectively cover computer programs 
and electronic databases, which are defined in Section 5 ―which by reason of the 
selection or arrangement of their contents constitute intellectual creations.‖  Exemptions 
for use of these materials is governed under the same three-step test as materials covered 
by the Berne Convention. Compare WCT, supra note 66, art. 10(2) (―[C]ertain special 
cases that do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the author‖) with Berne Convention, supra note 65, 
art. 9(2) (―certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a 
normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the author.‖).  Moreover, some suggest that there is ambiguity as to whether 
or not a state must in fact apply both the WCT three-step test and the Berne Convention 
three-step test to any copyright covered under both treaties. Sullivan Study, supra note 3, 
at 17. 
 83 The exception is the rights of broadcast organizations, which are not included in the 
WPPT and thus remain solely under the purview of the Rome Convention. Compare 
WPPT, supra note 66, pmbl. with Rome Convention, supra note 73, pmbl.  (―[t]he [Rome 
Convention] Contracting States, moved by the desire to protect the rights of performers, 
producers of phonograms, and broadcasting organizations‖) (emphasis added).   
 84 Compare WPPT, supra note 66, art. 1 with WCT, supra note 66, art. 1(4) (requiring 
compliance with various articles of the Berne Convention). 
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exemption in the WPPT is the ―same kind‖ test,85which, as noted 
previously, does not address this problem.
86
 
Simply stated, the three-step test only marginally recognizes 
information-access rights and thus provides insufficient support for 
those rights.
87
  Furthermore, the three-step test is not a mandatory 
test: states are free to reject copyright exemptions for VIPs or any 
other population, regardless of whether those exemptions are 
statutory or policy-based.  Thus, although some commentators 
believe that the three-step test can in fact be the vehicle of 
meaningful assistance to VIPs,
88
 multilateral IP treaties only 
minimally support VIPs‘ right to access appropriate-format 
materials. 
D. The WIPO Standing Committee on Copyright and Related 
Rights’ Debate on Copyright-Exemptions Treaty for VIPs 
1. WIPO SCCR Treaty Negotiations in Brief: November 2004 
to December 201 
In November 2004, the WIPO Standing Committee on 
Copyright and Related Rights (SCCR) took up discussions on a 
potential copyright-exemptions treaty for VIP information access, 
yielding several proposals and evidencing the vast negotiating 
                                                 
 85 See discussion supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text.  
 86 Supra note 79 and accompanying text.  Arguably, by not adopting any other 
exemptions from its basic governing terms, the WPPT restricts VIP information-access 
rights for performers‘ works and phonograms as compared to the Rome Convention. See 
supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 87 See, e.g., Silke von Lewinski, Fordham Eighteenth International IP Conference, 
Session 8, Part A: Trade/Copyright: IP Trade Policy; WIPO Treaty for the Blind 49 (Apr. 
9, 2010) [hereinafter von Lewinski, Fordham Conference] (transcript on file with author) 
(noting that the Berne Convention, and generally the three-step test, is  restrictive, and 
that States Parties are ―even free theoretically not to provide for any limitations,‖ and 
were states ―obliged to provide for limitations mandatorily, this would be a restriction, 
and I believe therefore against Article 20‖). 
 88 E.g., Guy Pessach, Reciprocal Share-Like Exemptions in Copyright Law, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1245, 1275 (2008); Pamela Samuelson, The US Digital Agenda at 
WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT‘L L. 369, 404–05 (1997) (discussing 1996 WIPO copyright treaty 
negotiations). See also Dr. Guido Westkamp, The “Three-Step Test” and Copyright 
Limitations in Europe: European Copyright Law Between Approximation and National 
Decision Making, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC‘Y U.S.A. 1, 26 (2008) (discussing the European 
Union version of the three-step test).  
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space separating rights-holders and those seeking greater access to 
protected works.
89
  The proposal to begin discussions partially 
stalled on the question of whether these discussions involved 
information sharing or norm setting,
90
 i.e., whether discussions 
would involve a restatement of existing international law principles 
or a propounding of new principles.  At the next SCCR meeting in 
November 2005, discussion continued on the merits of engaging in 
treaty discussions.  Non-state parties such as the International 
Publishers Association were firmly against a treaty, stating that 
copyright exemptions were ―the crudest and the bluntest tool in a 
large toolbox and were 19th century solutions to 21st century 
problems,‖ and that creative solutions developed pursuant to the 
three-step test are the only way to balance access rights and 
copyright-holder rights.
91
  State parties also expressed concern that 
discussion would result in new principles.  Benin and Morocco, 
among other countries, stated that a treaty should not harm rights-





 support for an exemptions-based treaty, 




Over the next six years, discussions have continued at each of 
the SCCR tri-annual meetings.
96
  There are currently four draft 
                                                 
 89 VON LEWINSKI, supra note 9, at 22.15 (2008) (citing Standing Committee on 
Copyright and Related Rights, Twelfth Session of the SCCR, SCCR/12/3 (Nov. 2, 2004) 
[hereinafter Twelfth Session Report]). 
 90 Id. 
 91 SCCR Secretariat, Thirteenth Session of the SCCR, ¶ 32, SCCR/13/6 (June 9, 2006) 
[hereinafter Thirteenth Session Report]. 
 92 Id. ¶¶ 37 and 49 (respectively, Benin and Morocco). 
 93 Id. ¶¶ 36, 39 and 44 (respectively, statements of United States, Australia and the 
European Community). 
 94 Id. ¶¶ 40, 47 and 50 (respectively, statements of New Zealand, Iran and 
Bangladesh). 
 95 Id. at ¶ 214. 
 96 E.g., SCCR Secretariat, Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights: 
Seventeenth Session—Meeting Documents, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/ 
details.jsp?meeting_id=16828 (last visited Oct. 26, 2011) (noting the Study on Copyright 
Limitations and Exceptions for Libraries and Archives as one of the meeting documents); 
SCCR Secretariat, Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights: Nineteenth 
Session—Meeting Documents, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/meetings /en/details.jsp? 
meeting_id=17462 (last visited Oct. 26, 2011) (noting the Study on Limitations and 
Exceptions for Copyright and Related Rights for Teaching in Africa and the Study on 
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instrument proposals before the SCCR—separate treaties drafted 
by the World Blind Union (WBU)
97
 and the African Group, a 
―consensus instrument‖ introduced by the U.S., and a joint 
recommendation introduced by the European Union delegation.
98
  
As indicated by the session reports of the SCCR Secretariat, treaty 
negotiations are continuing, but these discussions have ended 
either in general statements of principles by groups of nations or 
statements of disagreement on what type of international 
instrument, if any, the SCCR should adopt and present to the 
WIPO General Assembly for ratification.
99
  Some nations, 
primarily LDCs, either support the WBU proposal explicitly or 
support a multilateral treaty broadening VIP information-access 
rights.
100
  At the Twentieth Session in June 2010, for example, 
Thailand spoke on behalf of the Asian Group
101
 and, along with the 
                                                                                                             
Limitations and Exceptions for Copyright for Educational Purposes in the Arab 
Countries as two of the meeting documents). 
 97 This proposal was formally introduced by the Group of Latin American and 
Caribbean States (GRULAC).  
 98 SCCR Secretariat, Comparative List of Proposals Related to Copyright Limitations 
and Exceptions for the Visually Impaired Persons and Other Persons with Print 
Disabilities 2, SCCR/22/8 (Mar. 16, 2011), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs 
/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_22/sccr_22_8.pdf [hereinafter Comparative List of Proposals]. 
 99 Compare SCCR Secretariat, Eighteenth Session of the SCCR, SCCR/18/7 (Dec. 1, 
2010), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_18/sccr_18_7 
.pdf (―The Committee reconfirmed its commitment to work on the outstanding issues of 
the limitations and exceptions . . . .  Likewise, the Committee reaffirmed its commitment 
to continue without delay its work in a global and inclusive approach, including the 
multifaceted issues affecting access of the blind, visually impaired and other reading-
disabled persons to protected works‖) with SCCR Secretariat, Twentieth Session of the 
SCCR, ¶ 18, SCCR/20/13 Annex 1 (Dec. 7, 2010) [hereinafter Twentieth Session 
Report], available at http://www.wipo.int/ edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_20/ 
sccr_20_13.pdf (―The Committee agreed to work towards an appropriate international 
legal instrument or instruments, taking into account the four proposals currently tabled or 
any additional submissions.‖) and SCCR Secretariat, Comparative List of Proposals, 
supra note 98 (contrasting four different instruments proposed through the SCCR). 
 100 See Twentieth Session Report, supra note 99, ¶¶ 17–43 and 95–123 (statements of 
member states expressing support or disapproval of the WBU proposal and a treaty 
generally); SCCR Secretariat, Draft WIPO Treaty on Exceptions and Limitations for the 
Persons with Disabilities, Educational and Research Institutions, Libraries and Archives, 
SCCR/22/12 (June 3, 2011), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/ 
en/sccr_22/sccr_22_12.pdf (proposal by the African Delegation covering VIP 
exemptions, among other topics). 
 101 The Asian Group is a regional grouping of some 30 SCCR member states. See Asian 
Group’s Opening Statement at WIPO’s Standing Committee on Copyright and Related 
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Group of Latin American and Caribbean States (GRULAC),
102
 
strongly supported a treaty.
103
  In contrast, other nations, like 
Switzerland and the Group B bloc of developed nations,
104
 ―noted 
with interest the two new proposals put forward by the United 
States and the European Union and its 27 Member States,‖ neither 




At the twenty-second session of the SCCR, held in June 2011, 
it was revealed that a diverse group of nations and regional entities, 
comprising the United States, the European Union, the African 
Group, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Ecuador and Paraguay, had 
been meeting informally since February 2011 to bridge the gap 
between the four draft instrument proposals.
106
  These discussions 
yielded a non-SCCR document (a ―non-paper‖),107 that appeared to 
present a significant set of compromises between these divergent 
groups.
108
  However, the announcement of this document, and 
these compromises, was immediately followed by statements of 
disagreement about the ultimate instrument to be advanced,
109
 
suggesting that a complete consensus is still not on the horizon.
 
                                                                                                             
Rights, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INTERNATIONAL (―KEI‖) (June 21, 2010, 10:04 AM), 
http://keionline.org/node/872. 
 102 See Presiding GRULAC, Panama Hosts Farewell Lunch for the Permanent 
Representative of Dominica, PERMANENT MISSION OF PANAMA TO THE UNITED NATIONS 
(Mar. 25, 2010), http://www.panama-un.org/en/News/29-2010-03-25-Presiding-
GRULAC,-Panama-hosts-farewell-lunch-for-the-Permanent-Representative-of-
Dominica.html (spelling out acronym and listing member states). 
 103 Twentieth Session Report, supra note 99, ¶ 17. 
 104 See James Love, The WIPO SCCR 19 Begins Its Work, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY 
INTERNATIONAL (Dec. 14, 2009, 3:54 AM), http://keionline.org/node/721.  The Group B 
bloc is a ―group of high income countries that includes . . . the members of the European 
Union, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the Vatican.‖ 
Id.  These are the nations that also typically hold copyrights.  
 105 Twentieth Session Report, supra note 99, ¶ 18. 
 106 SCCR Secretariat, Twentieth Session of the SCCR, ¶ 112, SCCR/22/18 (July 15, 
2011), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_22/sccr_22_18 
.pdf (statement of the United States). See infra Part I.D.2 for a very brief explanation of 
these proposals. 
 107 SCCR Secretariat, Proposal on an International Instrument on Limitations and 
Exceptions for Persons with Print Disabilities, SCCR22/15 Rev. 1, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_22/sccr_22_15_rev.pdf. 
 108  Id. at ¶¶ 113–15. 
 109 See id. at ¶¶ 116–17 (noting back-to-back statements by Brazil and the European 
Union delegation immediately following the ―non-paper‖ statements, and respectively 
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2. The Four Current Proposals and State Reactions 
The first proposed instrument was a draft treaty developed by 
the WBU and formally introduced in May 2009 by Brazil, 
Uruguay and Paraguay. 
110
  This treaty grants an exemption for 
VIPs (covered by the treaty‘s definition of ―visual impairment‖) to 
access copyrighted works without the rights-holder‘s consent, 
provided certain conditions are met.
111
  LDC/South countries, 
including representatives from South America, Africa, and Asia 
where
 
the vast majority of VIPs live, generally favored the 
proposal.
112  Many nations additionally ―welcomed‖ the treaty, but 
did not express explicit support for it, concentrating instead on 
statements supporting the stakeholders‘ platforms113 or the need to 
move forward with treaty discussions in a neutral manner.
114 
In contrast, developed/North countries, the nations that possess 
the vast majority of copyright holders, generally disfavored the 
draft treaty.  These countries responded by presenting numerous 








                                                                                                             
noting that Brazil favored a treaty while the European Delegation was ―interested in 
results in the real world‖). 
 110 SCCR Secretariat, Proposal by Brazil Ecuador and Paraguay, Related to 
Limitations and Exceptions: Treaty Proposed by the World Blind Union (WBU), 
SCCR18/5, available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_18/sccr_18_ 
5.pdf. 
 111 Comparative List of Proposals, supra note 98, at Annex pp. 17–18 (quoting Article 
4 of the WBU draft treaty). 
 112 SCCR Secretariat, Nineteenth Session of the SCCR, ¶¶ 36, 86, and 89, SCCR/19/15 
(Aug. 6, 2010), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_19/sccr 
_19_15.pdf (respectively the statements of Indonesia, Uruguay, and Morocco) 
[hereinafter Nineteenth Session Report]. 
 113 See e.g., id. at ¶ 81.  
 114 Id. at ¶ 78 (statement of Senegal that ―the key issue in dealing with limitations and 
exceptions was to find a balance between rightholders and users but also, at the same 
time, a balance among the users themselves,‖ and that therefore the African group 
preferred ―a global approach to address the needs of all persons with disabilities‖). 
 115 Twentieth Session Report, supra note 99, ¶ 6 (noting discussion of the draft 
agreement proposed by Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico and Paraguay at the Eighteenth Session 
of the SCCR in May 2009). 
 116 Id. (noting ―draft joint recommendation‖ put forth by the E.U.). 
 117 Id. (noting the document put forth by the United States delegation, which it called a 
―draft consensus instrument‖).  
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timetables for drafting agreements.
118  
Ultimately, the United States 
offered a consensus instrument at the Twentieth Session in June 
2010
, 
recommending that states allow for importation and 
exportation—but not explicitly intra-state production—of VIP-
accessible works, but permitting states to refuse to do so when they 
believe that the work at issue is available in the other nation ―at a 
reasonable time and at a reasonable of price.‖119  The United States 
proposal is the only proposal to specifically reference Article 9(2) 
of Berne.
120
  The European Union also offered a proposal, which 
similarly calls on, but does not obligate, states to provide a national 
statutory exemption.
121
  The European Union proposal is 
particularly noteworthy because it explicitly conditions these 
exemptions on meeting the three-step test and on there existing no 




Finally, the African Group also proposed a treaty for a 
mandatory copyright exemption for covered VIPs.
123
  In contrast to 
the WBU treaty, the African proposal contains no exemptions 
when a for-profit entity disseminates the materials, nor any 
additional exemption for a covered VIP further copying a work for 
personal use.
124
  Thus, all proposals remain open for negotiation 
and potential passage in subsequent WIPO SCCR meetings; 
whether the SCCR will pass a VIP copyright exemptions treaty is 
an open question.  The arguments for and against this treaty are the 
subject of Part II. 
                                                 
 118 Id. (noting proposed timetable for treaty put forth by Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, and 
Paraguay). 
 119 Comparative List of Proposals, supra note 98, at Annex pp. 7, 25 (respectively 
quoting the preamble and Article 2 of the U.S. proposal). 
 120 Id. at Annex p. 7.  This could suggest that the U.S. proposal is essentially a treaty-
based interpretation of the three-step test. 
 121 Id, at Annex p. 19 (quoting Article 2 of the E.U. proposal). 
 122 Id.  
 123 SCCR Secretariat, Draft WIPO Treaty on Exceptions and Limitations for the 
Persons with Disabilities, Educational and Research Institutions, Libraries and Archives, 
SCCR20/11, available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_20/sccr 
_20_11.pdf. 
 124 Id. at Annex p. 17 (quoting Article 4 of the African Group proposal). 
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II.  SHOULD THERE BE A MULTILATERAL VIP COPYRIGHT 
EXEMPTIONS TREATY? 
As noted in the preceding section, there is no shortage of 
binding and non-binding proposals for further activity by the 
WIPO SCCR.  SCCR members have taken numerous actions, all in 
the course of developing points of agreement on a multilateral and 
global treaty of copyright exemptions for VIP access to 
information.
125
  But why a treaty?  Part II of this Note surveys 
some of the most commonly used and persuasive reasons why a 
WIPO copyright-exemption treaty for VIPs should or should not 
be adopted.
 
A. Arguments for a WIPO Copyright-Exemption Treaty for VIP 
Information-Access Rights 
Some international human rights scholars note that human 
rights-based arguments can be unpersuasive, because the 
obligations set forth in treaty documents and other binding 
agreements are so clearly recognized and necessary that they 
paradoxically have no effect on state action.
126  
However, despite 
the clear treaty obligations compelling state action, the status of 
VIP information access has not improved in recent years.
 
1. Human Rights-Based Concerns 
a) States Have Not Acted Sufficiently to Provide VIPs 
With Meaningful Access to Information
127
 
States and even regional organizations have developed formal 
legal copyright exemptions to provide VIPs within their political 
                                                 
 125 See supra notes 115–18. 
 126 See HESTERMEYER,  supra note 48, at 124 (quoting Martti Koskenniemi, The Pull of 
the Mainstream, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1946, 1946–47 (1990). 
Some norms seem so basic, so important, that it is more than slightly 
artificial to argue that states are legally bound to comply with them 
simply because there exists an agreement between them to that effect, 
rather than because . . . noncompliance would shock[] . . . the 
conscience of mankind and be contrary to elementary considerations 
of humanity.  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 127 See discussion infra Part I.D.1–2 (discussing statements by rights-holding and 
developing nations about the need for providing VIP access to information). 
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control with access to information.
128
  Yet even in these countries, 
the problem of access to information still exists.
129  
A treaty 
providing increased and explicit protection of VIP rights to access 
appropriate-format information would ideally, therefore, do what 
national and regional programs do not: recognize an obligation by 
trade representatives and intellectual property experts, rather than 
human rights defenders, to provide VIPs with access to currently 
unavailable materials.
 
Some might posit that the WIPO treaty is needed at least in part 
because the elite members of society who represent nations at these 
negotiations do not have any desire to otherwise assist VIPs in 
accessing appropriate-format materials.  This argument springs 
from the concern that elites in LDCs frequently trade intellectual 
property rights for things that they believe are more beneficial to 
their ―constituencies.‖130  With respect to the WTO Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), for 
example, many elites who represented their LDC accepted the 
agreement trading intellectual property rights because they 
believed it would lead to access to agricultural, apparel and other 
markets in developed nations.
131  
A treaty for the blind becomes 
desirable, then, to protect VIP rights against the limitations of these 
representative elites.
 
                                                 
 128 Sullivan Study, supra note 3, at 28–45. 
 129 The United States in particular has a robust copyright exemption statute in the 
Chafee Amendment, 17 U.S.C. § 121, and yet just as in other developed nations, only 
five percent of works are translated into VIP-accessible formats. Infra note 135 
(statement of Michele Woods of the US Copyright Office accepting the five-percent 
figure for developed and less-developed nations alike). 
 130 JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 21 (2001) (―Many developing countries agreed to this text, believing that they 
could limit the negotiations primarily to trade in counterfeit goods and other such trade-
related aspects.  This was a misreading not only of the text but also of the writing on the 
wall.‖) [hereinafter WATAL].; Bryan Mercurio, TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs: Recent 
Trends, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 215, 221 
(Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2006) (―[M]any developing countries do not 
hesitate to trade off IPRs [i.e., IP rights] in exchange for market access.‖  Property rights 
that they believe are more beneficial to their ―constituencies.‖  This is why the TRIPs 
agreement is a useful example: LDC representatives, the story goes, traded intellectual-
property rights for other, non-IP rights).  
 131 WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 129 
(2002), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/ 
WDSP/IB/2002/02/16/000094946_0202020411334/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf. 
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Some observers argue that under existing human rights and 
copyrights treaties, nations are already subject to sufficient 
obligations to provide VIPs with information access.
132
  Critics of 
a treaty for the blind could claim that because the CRPD was only 
passed in 2005 and fulfilled human rights treaty obligations are 
slow to realize,
133
 a treaty for the blind is premature.  However, 
compliance data gathered by the SCCR Secretariat indicates that 
the passage of the CRPD has had a negligible effect on national 
copyright exemptions.
134
  Absent analysis which suggests that 
substantial compliance with the CRPD has been delayed by some 
                                                 
 132 Hon. Weerawit Weeraworawit, Fordham Eighteenth International IP Conference, 
Session 8, Part A: Trade/Copyright: IP Trade Policy; WIPO Treaty for the Blind 29 (Apr. 
9, 2010) [hereinafter Weeraworawit, Fordham Conference] (transcript on file with 
author) (―Even the conventions and the agreements on intellectual property rights have 
paved the way, have allowed the member countries to do something for people with 
disabilities.  They do not need to wait for the international treaty.  They can do it now, 
especially people who are high-minded with the protection of human rights.  They‘ve got 
to lead the way.‖); KEI, Interview with David Hammerstein Regarding Negotiations on 
WIPO Treaty for Persons Who Are Blind or Have Other Disabilities ¶ 6 (Mar. 4, 2011), 
http://keionline.org/node/1087 (―Question 3.  How does the European Commission 
respond to the argument that the UN Convention on the rights of disabilities, including in 
particular Articles 21 and 30, obligate governments to change laws to provide more equal 
access to copyrighted works?‖). 
 133 ICESCR, supra note 37, art. 2(1) (―Each State Party to the [ICESCR] undertakes to 
take steps . . . with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights 
recognized‖).  It should be noted that this implementation timeframe is of course not 
restricted to human rights treaties; treaty implementation generally takes several years. 
 134 According to a 2006 WIPO SCCR survey—predating treaty discussions at the 
SCCR but contemporaneous with the passage of the CRPD—at least 30% of WIPO 
member states provided for national statutory exemptions for VIP information access.  
Pooley, Fordham Conference, supra note 8, at 4.  In an updated November 2010 survey 
by the SCCR Secretariat, that number had risen, but by as little as 3 percent. See SCCR 
Secretariat, Updated Report on the Questionnaire on Limitations and Exceptions, 37 
SCCR/21/7 (Oct. 2, 2010), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/ 
sccr_ 21/sccr_21_7.pdf.  
National statutes of 40 Member States include limitations and 
exceptions for the visually impaired. . . .  Nineteen Member States 
have general limitations and exceptions which in most cases cover 
any uses for the benefit of persons with any disability where the work 
is used in a manner directly related to the disability and to the extent 
required by the disability. 
Id.  However, only 61 of the 184 Member States responded to the questionnaire, so it 
possible that several states with national statutory exemptions are not included in this 
total. Id. at 6. 
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other condition then, this argument does not appear relevant to the 
treaty for the blind. 
Similarly, one can argue that a treaty is superior to an 
international agreement, joint resolution or other type of non-
binding document because national state exemptions and 
consensus statements have not resolved the issue.  In developed 
nations, only five percent of books have been translated into VIP-
accessible formats; in LDCs, only one percent of books are 
accessible to VIPs.
135
  These statistics suggest that current national 
efforts are inadequate. 
b) The Optional Protocol to the CRPD Does Not 
Sufficiently Encourage Cross-Border Information 
Sharing 
 A WIPO treaty could provide the missing incentive for 
nations to comply with existing international obligations to provide 
VIPs with information.  The Optional Protocol to the CRPD offers 
a mechanism for state accountability of non-compliance with 
CRPD provisions.  In theory, anyone who is dissatisfied with the 
efforts of a State Party to provide its citizen/VIPs with meaningful 
access to materials can complain to the CRPD Committee, which 
can then help move a state toward compliance.
136
  However, the 
                                                 
 135 See Michele Woods, Fordham Eighteenth International IP Conference, Session 8, 
Part A: Trade/Copyright: IP Trade Policy; WIPO Treaty for the Blind, 11 (Apr. 9, 2010) 
[hereinafter Woods, Fordham Conference] (transcript on file with author); Catherine 
Saez, World Blind Union Won’t be Sidetracked in Quest for Treaty on Reading Access, IP 
Watch, (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2011/03/10/world-blind-union-
won‘t-be-sidetracked-from-quest-for-treaty-on-reading-access/ (citing WBU President 
Maryanne Diamond for proposition that in developed countries only five percent of 
written works are VIP-accessible, while in LDCs only one percent of works are VIP-
accessible).  While developed nations have not questioned these data from the WBU, one 
may disagree with the WBU‘s characterization of this situation as a ―book famine.‖ See 
Dr. William Rowland, WBU President, Address on the Occasion of WBU‘s Press 
Conference Launching the WBU Global Right to Read Campaign (Apr. 23, 2008), 
available at g3ict.com/download/p/fileId_783/productId_124. 
136    Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. 
Res. 61/106, Annex II art. 1(a), U.N. Doc. A/61/611 (Dec. 6, 2006).  Presently only 66 
states are parties. United Nations Treaty Collection, 15.a. Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, UNITED NATIONS, (Feb. 13, 2011), 
available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
15-a&chapter=4&lang=en. 
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CRPD Committee is akin to other treaty bodies in that it cannot 
enforce rigorous compliance with obligations.
137
 
Assuming a state party has not rejected the CRPD Committee‘s 
competence,
138
 and that the submission made to the Committee 
complies with its stated conditions,
139
 Articles 6 and 7 of the 
Protocol permit of the CRPD Committee to investigate ―grave or 
systematic violations by a State Party of the rights set forth in the 
[CRPD]‖.140  However, the extent of the Committee‘s powers are 
limited; the investigatory power is suggested, not mandatory,
141
 
and is in part contingent on permission by the state.
142
  Thus, while 
non-compliance with treaty obligations can open states to national 
and international political pressure,
143
 a state may violate its 
obligations under the CRPD without necessary consequence. 
This is important because the lack of negative consequences to 
treaty violations is a common ground for criticizing international 
human rights treaties.
144
  Scholars, for example, often contrast the 
                                                 
 137 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 
6(1), May 23, 2008 (―If the Committee receives reliable information indicating grave or 
systematic violations by a State Party of rights set forth in the Convention, the Committee 
shall invite that State Party to cooperate in the examination of the information and to this 
end submit observations with regard to the information concerned.‖) (emphasis added). 
 138 Id. at art 8. (―Each State Party may, at the time of signature or ratification of the 
present Protocol or accession thereto, declare that it does not recognize the competence of 
the Committee provided for in articles 6 and 7.‖) 
 139 Id. at art. 2. 
 140 Id. at art. 6.  Articles 6 and 7 lay out the extent of the enforcement and punitive 
powers of the CRPD Committee. 
 141 Respectively, Articles 6(3), 6(4) and 7(2) permit the Committee to submit 
―comments and recommendations‖ to investigated States Party, require those States Party 
to ―submit its observations‖ concerning those comments and recommendations, and 
―invite the State Party concerned to inform it of the measures taken in response to‖ 
Article 6 actions. Id. art. 6(3), 6(4), and 7(2).  
 142 Article 6(2) states that the CRPD Committee, although it can rely on reports by third 
parties, may not itself conduct in-state investigations without the consent of the 
investigated State Party. Id. art. 6(2). 
 143 HESTERMEYER, supra note 48, at 196. 
 144 Id.  Hestermeyer offers an excellent explanation of this criticism in the context of 
conflicts between international legal regimes:  
[S]ome regimes boast strong enforcement mechanisms with the 
possibility of sanctions, others are enforced by shaming states into 
compliance, yet other regimes do not have an enforcement or 
adjudication mechanism.  . . .  Even though technically it is correct to 
state that this does not change the relationship of the [different legal 
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ineffectiveness of human rights treaties with the IP and trade 
treaties administered by the WTO and the General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs (GATT), which are generally hailed as 
successful in large part because of their strong non-compliance 
disincentives and robust enforcement mechanisms.
145
  The CRPD, 
by contrast, lacks robust enforcement mechanisms,
146
 and the other 
treaties on which VIPs might rely, i.e., the ICCPR and ICESCR, 
are not much stronger.
147
  Additionally, because human rights 
treaty bodies generally scale state compliance relative to the 
varying economic power of states to fulfill their treaty obligations, 
these treaties generally involve recommendations rather than 
obligations.
148
  Given this lack of full respect among states and 
                                                                                                             
regimes and enforcement mechanisms of international law] under 
general international law and that under general international law the 
outcome might be different, it is unrealistic to leave it at that.  If a 
state will abide by the solutions imposed by the regime with the 
strong enforcement mechanism and it is this mechanism that 
determines what will happen in fact, peu importe what doctrine holds 
dear. 
Id.  
 145 Id. at 214–15.  Hestermeyer notes that some commentators have actually suggested 
that WTO dispute-resolution bodies should be able to apply other international law, and 
specifically international human rights law, so that human rights advocates can take 
advantage of the power and respect for these bodies. 
 146 See supra at notes 140–47 and accompanying text.   
 147 See ICCPR, supra note 42 (providing in Articles 40–42 for mandatory national 
reporting on progress in implementing ICCPR provisions, but providing for no 
enforcement mechanism beyond ―friendly solution[s],‖ a ―Conciliation Commission,‖ 
and referral to the ICESCR Committee Chair); ICESCR, supra note 37 (providing in 
Articles 16–23 for mandatory national reporting on progress in implementing ICESCR 
provisions, but including no enforcement mechanism).  However, it is at least true that 
states, and to a limited degree non-states, could choose to enforce the provisions of these 
treaties through their own use of sanctions, shaming and coopting.  Emilie M. Hafner-
Burton, Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement 
Problem, 62 INT‘L ORG. 689–716 (2008) (arguing that shaming by states and non-states is 
an effective, albeit incomplete, enforcement mechanism); Andrew Moravcsik, Explaining 
International Human Rights Regimes: Liberal Theory and Western Europe, 1 EUR. J. 
INT‘L REL. 157, 179–80 (1995) (arguing that Europe has developed an effective human 
rights regime by ―‗shaming‘ and ‗coopting‘ domestic lawmakers, judges and citizens, 
who pressure governments from within for compliance,‖ although this requires an 
underlying respect for democracy and the rights at issue). 
 148 See CESCR, General Comment No. 5 (1994), available at http://www.unhchr. 
ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/4b0c449a9ab4ff72c12563ed0054f17d. E.g., TRIPs, supra note 66, art. 
66(1).  
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scholars for human rights obligations and evidence of non-
compliance, a WIPO treaty would arguably advance VIP rights by 
underscoring the significance of VIP rights in international 
political discourse. 
Both human rights advocates and WIPO treaty opponents 
respond that a WIPO treaty is superfluous because the rights at 
issue already exist.
149
  Therefore, they argue, efforts are better 
spent in creating compliance with existing agreements to respect 
these rights, such as through consensus-building with the most 
influential states and other international actors.
150
  These same 
human rights advocates however also note that this rebuttal does 
not fully answer the evidence that with human rights and even with 
                                                                                                             
In view of the special needs and requirements of least-developed 
country Members, their economic, financial and administrative 
constraints, and their need for flexibility to create a viable 
technological base, such Members shall not be required to apply the 
provisions of this Agreement, other than Articles 3, 4 and 5, for a 
period of 10 years from the date of application as defined under 
paragraph 1 of Article 65.  The Council for TRIPS shall, upon duly 
motivated request by a least-developed country Member, accord 
extensions of this period. 
Id. This does not mean that developed nations are required to immediately fulfill to the 
highest imaginable standard their human rights obligations.  All states are on the road of 
―progressive realization,‖ and in any case obligations at the international level are cast in 
rights language, not specific standards. See CESCR, General Comment No. 5, (1994), 
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/4b0c449a9ab4ff72c12563ed0054f17d. 
 149 Weeraworawit, Fordham Eighteenth International IP Conference, supra note 132, at 
30–31 (transcript on file with author).  
There have been so many conventions which have stressed the need 
to eliminate all forms of discrimination, especially discrimination 
against people with disabilities.  All these conventions oblige 
Member States to take actions, not just to sign the agreement and do 
nothing. . . .  Even the conventions and the agreements on intellectual 
property rights have paved the way, have allowed the member 
countries to do something for people with disabilities.  They do not 
need to wait for the international treaty.  They can do it now, 
especially people who are high-minded with the protection of human 
rights. 
Id. 
 150 See von Lewinski, Fordham Conference, supra note 87, at 23  (―First, let us save the 
time, effort, and money that you would otherwise need to get a treaty in order to fund, for 
example, the production of costly special-format editions — money spent otherwise for 
many meetings, documents, translations of documents, WIPO meetings, travel, et cetera, 
and especially time.‖). 
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international intellectual property treaties that provide for some 
VIP information-access rights, states have not even engaged in 
―progressive realization‖ of these rights.151  This is, in effect, why 
treaty advocates are pushing specifically for mandatory 
exemptions: they cannot compel their governments to fulfill VIP 
information-access rights.
152
  It seems clear that if neither the 
CRPD‘s efforts under the Optional Protocol nor VIP advocates‘ 
efforts have fostered even progressive realization, restating those 
rights in an international IP treaty will be more effective than 
working within these aforementioned existing channels. 
2. Arguments about Economic Efficiency 
a) States and NGOs Waste Significant Resources in 




 Economic arguments offer a second ground for supporting a 
WIPO VIP treaty.  States should support a WIPO treaty for VIP 
copyright exemptions because the existing system is not only 
ineffective, but inefficient.  Existing efforts are duplicated because 
each nation creates its own appropriate-format materials and does 
not share them (in addition to the fact that many countries cannot 
create any materials because of the high cost of doing so).  A 
WIPO treaty would therefore create greater access given existing 
expenditures and likely create efficiencies in national governments 
by centralizing and streamlining exemption-policy activities. 
                                                 
 151 Weeraworawit, supra note 132, at 31 (speaking of state compliance with VIP treaty 
obligations, ―[b]ut evidence [shows] that they haven‘t done it.‖). 
 152 See Love, Fordham Conference, supra note 1 (―Now, there is a second reason 
people want the harmonization, and that is that they don‘t think they can implement the 
exception within their own parliament if they think their consumer interests, or in some 
cases the right owner interests, are weak‖). 
 153 Woods, Fordham Conference, supra note 135.  Other commentators also suggest 
that countries can incur enormous costs in understanding international copyright regimes 
and limiting the force of their laws for fear of violating international law. Margot E. 
Kaminski & Dr. Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Addressing the Proposed WIPO International 
Instrument on Limitations and Exceptions for Persons with Print Disabilities: 
Recommendation or Mandatory Treaty?, at 18 (Nov. 14, 2011), available at 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1959694 (working paper). 
SCHEINWALD.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2012  5:13 PM 
482 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 22:445 
Beyond the cost of negotiating copyright licenses to actually 
provide materials and the administrative cost of running copyright-
exemption programs,
154
 VIPs in many countries lack access to 
appropriate-format materials because it is expensive to produce 
these materials.  An instructive example both of the efforts needed 
to produce VIP-accessible formats and the overwhelming need for 
VIP-appropriate digital media is the production of a Braille version 
of a Harry Potter book.  The version, produced by the National 
Braille Press, had a production cost of $63 per copy.
155
  Assuming 
that these producers sell at production cost, a non-VIP can still 
purchase a box set of all seven standard-print Harry Potter books in 
hardcover format for less than the cost of two Braille books.
156
  
More importantly, even in a developed country like Australia, the 
economies of scale in providing Braille works are daunting: 
providing the cost equivalent of a Braille Harry Potter series to its 
300,000 VIPs who suffer from correctable visual impairment 
would cost the government $133 million.
157
 
Moreover, when alternatives to physical works are available, 
there is often little demand for these materials anyway, because 
                                                 
 154 See, e.g., U.K. INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, COPYRIGHT AND VISUALLY IMPAIRED 
PEOPLE: CONSULTATION PAPER ON AN EXCEPTION TO COPYRIGHT FOR THE BENEFIT OF 
VISUALLY IMPAIRED PEOPLE (2001), available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/benefit.pdf 
(noting administration and licensing-negotiation costs, among other costs, as not being 
included in the bare act of reproducing a work in an accessible format as being 
substantial for producers). 
 155 Harry Potter in Braille: Press Information, NAT‘L BRAILLE PRESS (Oct. 10, 2011, 
10:10 AM), http://www.nbp.org/ic/nbp/publications/potter_press.html (noting the 
production cost of the Braille format).  
 156 As of November 2010, a discounted price for the box set was $114.  See, e.g., Harry 
Potter Hardcover Boxed Set (Books 1–7), BARNES & NOBLE (Oct. 12, 2011), 
http://search.barnesandnoble.com/Harry-Potter-Hardcover-Boxed-Set/J-K-Rowling/e/978 
0545044257. 
 157 See CERA, supra note 20 (referencing Australia‘s VIP population at 430,000, with 
300,000 suffering from correctable visual impairment); ACCESS ECON. PTY. LTD., Clear 
Insight: The Economic Impact and Cost of Vision Loss in Australia, EYE RESEARCH 
AUSTRALIA, 11–12 (2004), http://www.cera.org.au/uploads/CERA_clearinsight.pdf; see 
also James Love, Why Is the Obama Administration Not Standing up for People with 
Disabilities? ¶¶ 4–5, HUFFINGTON POST (June 18, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
james-love/on-treaty-for-the-blind-o_b_617451.html (referencing example of Uruguay, 
which can only produce approximately 50 VIP-accessible works annually due to 
production costs). 
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translated, longer-length works are very difficult to transport,
158
 
especially in comparison to modern technologies such as e-
readers.
159
  The $63 Braille version of the Harry Potter book, for 
instance, is fifty-six one-foot-tall volumes.
160
  Instead, many VIPs 
tend to use digital technologies,
161
 as these are far more mobile and 
dynamic devices than Braille books.
162
  To a large degree, the 
challenge that VIPs face is gaining access to these new 
technologies available to non-disabled persons. 
Noteworthy here is the work of the DAISY Consortium, a 
Swiss-based international organization that has established open-
source standards and other information-sharing practices to 
facilitate global sharing.
163
  The U.S. Library of Congress and its 
counterparts in Sweden, Japan, and other nations all utilize the 
DAISY standard in creating VIP-accessible formats.
164
  While 
translation costs are still an issue for countries that do not speak the 
languages into which an accessible work has been translated,
165
 
                                                 
 158 Rachel Aviv, Listening to Braille, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2009, at MM42, available 
at  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/03/magazine/03Braille-t.html.    
 159 Contrast, for example, the fifty-six one-foot-tall volumes of a VIP-accessible Harry 
Potter book with an e-reader such as the Amazon Kindle, which can hold three thousand 
or more books in a device that is roughly half the size of a sheet of paper and only one-
third of an inch thick. Compare Aviv, supra note 158, with Kindle Wireless Reading 
Device, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com (select ―Kindle‖ and ―Kindle $79‖ from 
upper left-hand menu; product size is at bottom of page). 
 160 See Aviv, supra note 158; National Braille Press, supra note 155.   
 161 See Aviv, supra note 158.  
 162 See, e.g., id.  For example, the knfbReader Mobile combines a cellular telephone 
and visual-to-speech text recognition technology in a cellular telephone device size. 
KnfbReader Mobile, READING TECH., INC. (Oct. 20, 2011, 12:50 PM), http://www. 
knfbreader.com/products-mobile.php. 
 163 About Us, DAISY CONSORTIUM (Oct. 20, 2011, 12:58 PM), 
http://www.daisy.org/about_us.  DAISY stands for Digital Accessible Information 
System, and is essentially a standardized process for creating audiobooks. 
 164 See id. (listing some prominent nations that utilize DAISY standards). 
 165 As national and non-profit entities generally create audiobooks only in the languages 
that they need, additional translation work would still be required. See id.  This cost, 
however, would be comparatively less than the current costs required to license a work 
for a specific translation:  
There is a major problem with the translation of materials.  This is 
particularly serious as many African countries have more than ten 
languages.(various e-mails and interviews) . . . .  There are also few 
translations of works from one African language into another (e.g., 
from Bantu (South Africa and elsewhere) into Edo, Yoruba or Hausa 
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there are generally no technological compatibility issues inhibiting 
regional and global sharing, and nations sharing a common 
language could begin providing works to VIPs immediately.
166
 
However, many countries, and particularly LDCs with the 
majority of VIPs, do not have the resources to produce these 
materials.  They also cannot obtain these materials, regardless of 
price, from other nations and their exemption-program 
representatives, as states generally do not share these materials.
167
 
The lack of an international treaty that supports the 
copyright exception to export and the import of 
titles developed by libraries serving persons with 
disabilities has meant that it is impossible for 
organizations working under the Chafee 
[A]mendment [in the United States] to move titles 
across the national boundary.  Additionally, it has 
been impossible to use titles developed in other 
countries in the [United States].
168
 
                                                                                                             
(Nigeria) or vice versa.)  Generally the right to make a translation 
must be individually acquired for each translation into a different 
language.  The overall situation reinforces the inequality of 
languages, privileges European languages, and means that tens of 
millions of Africans are unable to get access to or read books and 
articles published in languages other than their own. 
ALAN STORY, STUDY PAPER 5: STUDY ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE 
INTERNET, AND COPYRIGHT, COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 48, 
available at http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/study_papers/sp5_story_ 
study.pdf (quoting Sustainable Book Provision—Chapter 5: How to Do It, United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Basic Learning 
Materials Initiative, (Oct. 24, 2011, 10:05 AM), http://www.unesco.org/ 
education/blm/chap5_en.php).  
 166 See Love, supra note 1 (―The U.S. does not export to Canada, Jamaica, Kenya, 
South Africa, England, Australia, India or the many countries where people speak 
English as a [primary or] second[ary] language.‖).  As others have noted, however, 
DAISY technology utilizes the LAME mp3 encoder, which is subject to patent issues in 
some countries, and the DAISY technology itself is patented in the United States. But see 
Patrick Hely, Note, A Model Copyright Exemption to Serve the Visually Impaired: An 
Alternative to the Treaty Proposals Before WIPO, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 1369, 
1404 (2010); Save as DAISY—Microsoft Word Add-In, DAISY CONSORTIUM (Sep. 16, 
2011), http://www.daisy.org/project/save-as-daisy-microsoft-word-add-in. 
 167 Love, supra note 1. 
 168 GEORGE KERSCHER, RESPONSE TO COPYRIGHT OFFICE QUESTIONS ON THE TOPIC OF 
FACILITATING ACCESS TO COPYRIGHTED WORKS FOR THE BLIND OR PERSONS WITH OTHER 
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High costs and state practice create virtually insurmountable 
barriers for most VIPs.  In sum, as with the vast difference in the 
price of works from LDCs to developed nations, VIPs, and the 
national actors who would help them, lack the financial resources 
to produce or gain access to materials.
169
  Without a WIPO treaty 
for the blind, inefficient production of VIP-accessible materials 




3. Arguments About Conflicts Between Legal Paradigms 
a) Broad Consensus Supports Berne‘s Three-Step Test and 
Prohibition Against Broader Copyright Exemptions 
Presently, the vast weight of authority from IP scholars, 
international IP business leaders, and national IP representatives is 
that the three-step test is the best, and should remain the only, 
                                                                                                             
DISABILITIES 9 (2009), http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sccr/comments/2009/kerscher.pdf.  
As Kerscher additionally notes:  
the example of the last Harry Potter book, which was produced by 
most libraries serving persons with disabilities[, was] a huge 
duplication of effort.  With only approximately 5% of titles ever 
being made accessible to persons with disabilities, having to produce 
the same book in different jurisdictions is most frustrating. 
Id. at 9.  The Chafee Amendment, 17 U.S.C. § 121 (2004), provides to the ―blind or other 
persons with disabilities‖ access through select, named, trusted intermediaries to any 
―previously published, nondramatic literary work‖ on the condition that ―such copies or 
phonorecords are reproduced or distributed in specialized formats exclusively for use by 
blind or other persons with disabilities.‖ 17 U.S.C. § 121(a)-(b)(1)(A).  ―Specialized 
formats‖ generally are ―braille, audio, or digital text which is exclusively for use by blind 
or other persons with disabilities.‖ Id. at § 121(d)(4)(A). 
 169 Additionally, textbooks are one of the most impactful areas of a potential WIPO 
treaty, ―[i]n its Basic Learning Materials Initiative, UNESCO states [that] ‗In poor 
countries, with untrained teachers, the textbook becomes the most important, if not the 
only vehicle for the curriculum.‘‖ Story, supra note 165, at 47 (quoting Sustainable Book 
Provision—Chapter 5: How to Do It, UNESCO Basic Learning Materials Initiative (Oct. 
24, 2011, 10:05 AM), http://www.unesco.org/education/blm/chap5_en.php).  
 170 As stated previously, the vast majority of VIPs are nationals of less-developed 
countries, nations have several priorities ahead of VIP access-to-information rights.  Each 
of the types of rights at issue in this discussion, for example, can be broadened to a 
general population right that is in many of the nations acute.  The chances of substantial 
policy and financial resources being brought to bear on this problem, therefore, are slim. 
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means of protecting copyright rights-holders.
171
  This position is 
reasonable, given the importance accorded to the three-step test in 
the Berne and Rome Conventions, the WCT and WPPT, and 
TRIPs.  However, given the failure of voluntary action by private 
actors and national information-sharing programs to provide VIPs 
with meaningful access to appropriate-format technologies, it can 
be argued that at least for the proposed treaty, it is exactly the 
three-step test that the WIPO SCCR must dispense with if states 
are to fulfill VIP information-access rights. 
It is worth noting that not every aspect of every international IP 
treaty relies on the three-step test exclusively.  Mandatory 
exceptions, in other words, do exist in international IP and trade 
law.
172
  For example, Article 27 of the Convention on International 
Civil Aviation provides a mandatory exception for patent 
infringement protections,
173
 as does Article 5ter of the Paris 
Convention.
174
  These examples are, however, limited to very 
specific circumstances of patent law, whereas the three-step test is 
valid for, among other areas of law, all of international copyright 
law.
175
  One could argue that these exceptions are exactly the sort 
of ―certain special cases‖176 the three-step test contemplates. 
Nonetheless, this limited instance of mandatory exemptions 
provides some support for similar exemptions in the case of VIP 
rights.  Additionally, while in the human rights context the VIP 
population of several hundred million is a population eminently 
worthy of protection, in the context of ―certain special cases‖ that 
                                                 
 171 See, e.g., infra notes 180–86 and accompanying text (quoting official positions and 
statements of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Recording Industry Association of 
America, the United States Copyright Office, and IP professors); supra Part I.D.2 (noting 
the opposition of the SCCR delegates from the United States and European Union 
member states, among others, to a treaty that would appear to depart from the Berne 
three-step test). 
 172 The following two examples come from statements made by James Love.  Love, 
Fordham Conference, supra note 1. 
 173 Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 27, 2006 (9th ed.), 15 U.N.T.S. 295, 
available at http://www.icao.int/icaonet/arch/doc/7300/7300_9ed.pdf. 
 174 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5ter, Mar. 20, 1833, 
828 U.N.T.S. 305, available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/ip 
/paris/pdf/trtdocs_wo020.pdf. 
 175 Supra Part I.C. 
 176 Berne Convention, supra note 65, art. 9(2). 
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might be afforded an exemption under the three-step test, an 
exemption that would affect at most less than five percent of the 
population is arguably that type of instance.
177
  This position can 
be contrasted with that of a general education exemption, which, 




4. Arguments about Practical Political Concerns 
a) Public and Private Entities Perceive the Treaty as a 




Beyond current resistance by the United States, the European 
Union nations, and other rights-holder states, industry associations 
in the United States have voiced deep opposition to a WIPO VIP 
treaty.  Based on public statements, this opposition stems from the 
belief that a WIPO treaty that provides exemptions for VIP rights 
will undermine existing respect for current norms of global 
copyright law.  These statements are made in opposition to the 
2009 draft treaty proposal introduced by Brazil, Ecuador and 
Paraguay, but they notably lack support—binding (i.e., a treaty) or 
not—for these arguments.180 
                                                 
 177 See discussion supra Part I.A (detailing the prevalence of treatable visual 
impairment). 
 178 See, e.g., Letter from Michael Mabe, Chief Exec. Officer, Int‘l Ass‘n of Scientific, 
Technical and Med. Publishers (STM), to Hon. James Moore, Minister of Canadian 
Heritage and Official Languages, Canadian Heritage and Official Languages, Canadian 
House of Commons, and Hon. Tony Clement, Minister of Indus., Indus. Canada (Sep. 28, 
2010), available at http://www.stm-assoc.org/2010_09_28_STM_Submission_Bill_ 
C32_the_Copyright_Modernization_Act.pdf (―STM notes that ‗education‘ is not clearly 
defined in the Bill which makes the scope of the exception overly broad and therefore 
fails to define a special case under the three-step test.‖). 
 179 Many experts note that a substantial barrier to the passage of robust WIPO treaty for 
VIP rights is the issue of ―precedent,‖ or alternatively stated, that permitting broad 
exemptions that foster access to materials will both erupt into global piracy of these 
works and other intellectual property. See Love, supra note 1, at 18–19 (transcript on file 
with author).  
 180 The copyright industry organizations and Chamber of Commerce letters respectively 
advocate for WIPO ―initiatives‖ and a ―work stream.‖ Letter from Steven J. Metalitz, 
counsel to RIAA and other copyright-related industry associations, to Maria Pallante, 
Associate Register, Policy and Int‘l Affairs, US Copyright Office 5 (Nov. 13, 2009), 
available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sccr/comments/2009/comments-2/steven-j-
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Publishing and entertainment industry associations such as the 
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and the 
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), and general 
business associations such as the United States Chamber of 
Commerce, oppose the treaty on two grounds: first, that mandatory 
exemptions are categorically disruptive of the delicate balance 
between IP protections and human rights (in this case, VIP 
information needs), and second, that mandatory exemptions will 
drive rampant piracy of copyrighted works.
181
  Rights-holder 
representative groups argue that exemptions are too rigid, or too 
categorical, to respect rights-holders‘ legal entitlements.  This 
argument includes assertions that: (1) mandatory exceptions are 
incompatible with the international law practice of permitting 
states to implement treaties over several years;
182
 (2) mandatory 
exceptions are incompatible with the consensus long-term goal of 
fostering a market solution for VIP rights
 
(arguably the most cost-
effective and efficient solution);
183
 and (3) over the even longer 
term, ―mandatory exception[s] could be more difficult to tailor to 
changing circumstances.‖184  These groups further claim that 
exemptions are particularly inappropriate for VIP rights because in 
situations where ―resources are already scarce, the existence of 
copyright-exemptions further reduces incentives to invest in the 
production and distribution of works in accessible formats to 
market.‖185  For all of these reasons, group representatives argue, a 
                                                                                                             
metalitz-aap-ifta-mpaa-nmpa-riaa.pdf (opposing the draft agreement proposed by Brazil, 
Ecuador, and Paraguay) [hereinafter Metalitz Letter]; Letter from Brad Huther, Senior 
Director, US Chamber of Commerce, to Maria Pallante, Associate Register for Policy 
and Int‘l Affairs, Copyright Office, Library of Congress 3 (Oct. 13, 2009), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sccr/comments/2009/reply-2/4-brad-huther.pdf 
[hereinafter Huther Letter]. 
 181 Metalitz Letter, supra note 180, at 2–5; Hunther Letter, supra  note 180, at 2–5. 
 182 See HESTERMEYER supra note 48, at 108 (noting that ICESCR Article 2(1) requires 
states to take steps to effect ICESCR rights, and ―the ‗obligation to take steps‘ means that 
States Parties have to establish a reasonable action programme towards the full 
realization of the rights and to start its implementation within a reasonably short time‖ 
(internal citations omitted)). 
 183 See infra note 135 (discussing US perspective that a market solution is the optimal 
solution to conflicts between copyright and human rights, and other copyright-related 
issues (statement of Michele Woods)). 
 184 Metalitz letter, supra note 180, at 4. 
 185 Huther Letter, supra note 180, at 2. 
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treaty is inadvisable, and other initiatives such as collaborative 




While many of these rights-holder representative associations 
support expanding VIP access to some degree,
187
 they worry that 
mandatory treaty exemptions would drive global piracy of 
copyright materials.
188
  The weight of the ―gateway drug‖ 
argument is grounded in the fear that the proposed treaty is the 
―thin edge of the wedge‖ to the users‘ rights movement.189  In 
other words, piracy would not be driven by VIPs themselves, but 
rather that the treaty exemptions would indirectly cause those 
individuals and entities who believe that international copyright 
law restricts consumers‘ rights too strongly to begin disregarding 
copyright law altogether.  Thus, because a treaty would likely 
                                                 
 186 Metalitz Letter, supra note 180. 
 187 See, e.g., id. at 2 (―We strongly endorse and support reasonable efforts to increase 
the practical and functional access of blind and visually impaired persons to works 
protected by copyright.‖). 
 188 As Steven J. Metalitz, counsel to RIAA and other copyright-related industry 
associations, argues: 
Furthermore, there is serious risk that the likely impact of the draft 
treaty will not be confined to the four corners of the document, 
widely spaced though they be.  Viewed in context, the draft treaty 
appears to many as the not-so-thin edge of a wedge to be driven into 
the longstanding structure of global copyright norms.  It advocates a 
U-turn in the approach to global copyright norms that would almost 
certainly not be restricted to the issue of access for the visually 
impaired, or even for the disabled community generally.  Adoption of 
this proposal would be used to justify its radical approach—
mandating in national law exceptions and limitations that reach far 
beyond what would be even permissible under global norms today—
in many other fields of copyright law. 
Metalitz Letter, supra note 180, at 5 (opposing the draft agreement proposed by Brazil, 
Ecuador, and Paraguay). See also Huther Letter, supra note 180:  
If a ‗minimum flexibilities‘ approach were adopted, even in an 
agreement limited in scope to accessibility of copyrighted works for 
persons with certain disabilities, this approach could be adopted in 
other areas as well.  Such a precedent could have a broad impact in 
international organizations beyond WIPO, such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and other UN agencies. 
Id.  
 189 See generally Interview by Carrie Russell with Ray Patterson, Professor, Univ. of 
Ga. (2010), available at https://www.ala.org/ala/issuesadvocacy/copyright/ 
copyrightarticle/usersrightscopyright.cfm. 
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boost piracy and upset the balance between the rights of copyright 
holders and the rights of the public, a treaty for the blind is 
impossible. 
One answer to this argument is that there is no way to legally 
interpret a VIP copyright exemptions treaty beyond the ―four 
corners of the document‖ according to the Vienna Convention on 
the Interpretation of Treaties.  Article 31(1) clearly states that 
treaties may only be interpreted ―in good faith in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose.‖190  Whatever the 
fears of rights-holders that a treaty may be misinterpreted by 
persons who are not party to it, this is not a reason to not pass a 
treaty at all, but rather to ensure, as with TRIPs and the WTO 
dispute resolution mechanism, that there is robust enforcement of 
treaty violations.
191
  Thus, piracy concerns, or the ‗thin edge of the 
wedge‘ argument, are fodder for discussing how enforcement of 
international copyright law on the whole is to be increased to 
protect rights holders. 
B. Arguments Against a WIPO Copyright-Exemption Treaty for 
VIP Information Access Rights 
1. Arguments about Human Rights-Based Concerns 
a) An Irreconcilable Conflict Between IP Rights-Holders 
and VIPs Precludes the Desired Mandatory Copyright 
Exemptions 
The UDHR and ICESCR both contain clear statements of 
human rights protections for creators of intellectual property.  The 
UDHR states that ―[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the 
moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary 
or artistic production of which he [or she] is the author.‖192  This 
                                                 
 190 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/ conventions/ 
1_1_1969.pdf. 
 191 Supra notes 141–46 and accompanying text (discussing the power of TRIPs and 
other WTO-administered agreements as relying in large part on their robust enforcement 
mechanisms). 
 192 UDHR, supra note 35. 
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phrasing is echoed in the ICESCR, which protects the author‘s 
rights to ―moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, 
literary or artistic production of which he is the author.‖193  Beyond 
the economic incentive for a strong international copyright 
protection regime, then, human rights treaties themselves arguably 
create a conflict between creator rights and VIP rights that cannot 
be resolved through a WIPO treaty for the blind, and a treaty is 
therefore inadvisable. 
Evidence of human rights protections for intellectual property 
is available in three forms.  First, while IP human rights is 
admittedly not within mainstream IP law discourse, several IP 
scholars have lent weight to the argument that IP human rights are 
of the same level as cultural or political rights.
194
  Second, human 
rights-based protection is a desire of international IP elites is 
evidenced by inclusion in the Berne Convention of a moral duty to 
protect creations.
195
  Third, the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (CESCR), which is charged with administering 
and interpreting the ICESCR,
196
 issued interpretive rules on Article 




These rules, while non-binding, create human rights for 
creators of intellectual property that are both more expansive and 
                                                 
 193 ICESCR, supra note 37. 
 194 See Laurence Helfer, Collective Management of Copyrights and Human Rights: An 
Uneasy Alliance Revisited, in COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHTS AND RELATED 
RIGHTS 75–104 (Daniel Gervais ed., 2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter Helfer, Collective 
Management]. 
 195 Berne Convention, supra note 65, art. 6bis. 
 196 OHCHR, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Monitoring the 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/ (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2011). 
 197 CESCR, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Follow-up to the day of general 
discussion on article 15.1 (c), Monday, November 2001,  (Dec. 14, 2001) 
E/C.12/2001/15, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/ 
statements/E.C.12.2001.15HRIntel-property.pdf [hereinafter IP Creator and Consumer 
Human Rights]; CESCR, General Comment No. 17 (2005): The right of everyone to 
benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he or she is the author (article 15, 
paragraph 1 (c), of the Covenant), E/C.12/GC/17 ( Jan. 12, 2006) [hereinafter General 
Comment No. 17]. 
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more limited than traditional national IP protections.
198
  These 
differences are not merely of degree, but rather in kind: 
The fact that the human person is the central subject 
and primary beneficiary of human rights 
distinguishes human rights, including the right of 
authors to the moral and material interests in their 
works, from legal rights recognized in intellectual 
property systems. Human rights are fundamental, 
inalienable and universal entitlements belonging to 
individuals, and in some situations groups of 
individuals and communities.  Human rights are 
fundamental as they derive from the human person 
as such, whereas intellectual property rights derived 
from intellectual property systems are instrumental, 
in that they are a means by which States seek to 
provide incentives for inventiveness and creativity 
from which society benefits.
199
 
Specifically, then, IP human rights protect the rights of natural 
persons who create intellectual property to maintain their creative 
autonomy and enjoy the material benefits resulting from that 
property.
200
  They do not protect the profit motive, they are 
inalienable—especially with respect to non-natural persons—and 
are fundamental rather than instrumental.
201
  In sum then, as the 
moral human rights of IP authors and creators appear to be on an 
equal plane with the human rights of VIPs,
202
 there is a conflict 
                                                 
 198 Helfer, Collective Management, supra note 194, at 86–87.  
 199 IP Creator and Consumer Human Rights, supra note 197, ¶ 6. 
 200 Helfer, Collective Management, supra note 194, at 86.  
 201 IP Creator and Consumer Human Rights, supra note 197, ¶ 6; HESTERMEYER, supra 
note 48, at 157–58. 
 202 HESTERMEYER, supra note 48, at 157–58 (explaining that ICESCR article 15(1) 
protects inventors‘ moral rights as a ―true human right‖).  As Hestermeyer further notes, 
some commentators do differentiate among the rights propounded in global human rights 
treaties; for example, scholars may reject the equality of social, economic and cultural 
rights with civil and political rights because the former are progressive and goal-oriented 
and the latter are basic and immediately mandatory and binding. Id. at 88.  However, this 
creates a distinction in the justiciability of these norms, but it does not create a difference 
in the equality of these types of rights. Id.  All human rights carry with them the same 
obligation to protect, respect and fulfill. Id. at 108–10 (citing Asbjørn Eide, The New 
International Economic Order and the Protection of Human Rights: Report on the Right 
to Adequate Food as a Human Right, ¶¶ 66–115, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub/.2/1987/23 
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between VIPs who need access to information to enjoy their rights, 
and intellectual property creators who may need to withhold that 
access in order to enjoy their rights. 
The powerful protection of human rights is not available to 
copyright holders in all instances, however, because most 
copyright holders are corporations.  Some scholars therefore 
dispute the existence of such a conflict.  These scholars argue that 
there is no intent among treaty drafters or in contemporary state 
practice to create a human rights obligation for IP protection that 
extends to corporations or other non-natural persons,
203
 and further 
that the materiality standard articulated within these treaties readily 
coexists with the rights of VIPs to access appropriate-format 
information.
204
  As regards the treaties themselves, ―[t]he situation 
with respect to Article 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR is . . . [that] the 
language of the provision . . .  fails to mention corporations as 
possible beneficiaries [and that] the history of international human 
rights law indicates that the provision was meant for the benefit of 
individuals.‖205  The ICESCR Committee has explicitly noted that 
―legal entities are included among the holders of intellectual 
property rights‖ under the human rights treaties, but that ―their 
entitlements, because of their different nature, are not protected at 
the level of human rights.‖206 
                                                                                                             
(1987)). These IP-protection rights in the ICESCR would therefore be granted the same 
significance as other economic, social and cultural rights, and as civil, political, and other 
basic human rights. 
 203 Helfer, Collective Management, supra note 194, at 80 n.15 (quoting Paul 
Torremans, Copyright as a Human Right, in COPYRIGHT AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FREEDOM 
OF EXPRESSION—INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY—PRIVACY 181 (P. Torremans ed. 2004))  
What we know is that the initial strong criticism that intellectual 
property was not properly speaking a Human Right or that is already 
attracted sufficient protection under the regime of protection afforded 
to property rights in general was eventually defeated by a coalition of 
those who primarily voted in favour because they felt that the moral 
rights deserved and needed protection and met the Human Rights 
standard . . . . 
Id.  In other words, copyright as a human right exists according to broad agreement only 
insofar as the moral rights, i.e., the rights of individual creators to have their name 
attached to the publication of the work and the right to derive a reasonable standard of 
living from that publication, are the rights at issue.  
 204 HESTERMEYER, supra note 48, at 154–55.   
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. at 155 (quoting General Comment No. 17, supra note 197, ¶ 5). 
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Still, there are wrinkles as to how this argument limiting the 
applicability of human rights to intellectual property rights-holders 
plays out in the realm of copyright.  In the case of pharmaceuticals, 
the impact is clear: patent-holders are invariably corporations (and 
generally corporations whose GDP and global political influence 
rivals that of states).
207
  Patent rights may be human rights to 
protect the moral and material interests of individual inventors,
208
 
but there is little advocacy
209
 for extending that protection to all 
patent holders.  For copyright holders, this distinction is less clear.  
Authors of literary works, for example, do not sell all rights to the 
work to the publishing houses that produce and market the work.
210
  
Nor do musical artists.
211
  Many individual copyright holders, then, 
have a material interest that is potentially infringed if 
reproductions of their work are made, and pursuant to human 
rights arguments, no remuneration is made to those individuals, as 
the global copyright regime requires.
 
                                                 
 207 Id. at 95.  Merck, for example, had $46 billion in sales for the 2010 calendar year. 
Merck, Merck Announces Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2010 Financial Results (Feb. 3, 
2011), available at http://www.merck.com/newsroom/news-release-archive/financial 
/2011_0203.html.  If one equates sales with national production as measured by Gross 
National Income (GNI), Merck would be approximately the 102nd wealthiest nation. See 
World Bank, Indicators: GNI (current $US), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY. 
GNP.MKTP.CD?order=wbapi_data_value_2010+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-
last&sort=asc (last visited Jan. 13, 2012) (using 2010 data).   
 208 HESTERMEYER, supra note 48, at 155–58.   
 209 Hestermeyer notes that pharmaceutical companies and other patent rights-holders 
could pursue claims in national and regional courts based on regional human rights 
treaties such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which 
specifically mentions intellectual property rights as generally protected property rights. 
Id. at 158. 
 210 For example, the rights of authors publishing through Elsevier, authors retain the 
right to publish derivative works (such as books), the right to present copies of the work 
at a conference or other meeting, and the right to publish on one‘s personal or institution 
website a post-publication revised version of the work to reflect the peer review process. 
Authors’ Rights & Responsibilities, ELSEVIER, http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/ 
authorsview.authors/rights (last visited Oct. 10, 2011). 
 211 For example, while a standard contract between a songwriter and publisher would 
transfer all or virtually all rights to the publisher, co-publishing and administration 
agreements provide songwriters with many rights; in any case, songwriters may retain the 
contractual right to license their music for dramatic performances, or at least retain the 
right to withhold consent for such use. AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC 
LICENSING 100–01, 1465–67 (4th ed. 2010). 
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One potential rebuttal to this counterargument is that the global 
market for works in formats required by VIPs is insufficient to 
stimulate creation of these particular works, either by corporate 
rights-holders or individual creators.  In the absence of market 




  The best example of this market failure is in the realm of 
audiobooks, the VIP-appropriate format with the greatest mass-
market appeal.  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce specifically notes 
that audiobooks are the most significant convergence of VIP-
appropriate and mass-market formats, stating that ―in recent years 
publishers have been able to produce market-ready, accessible 
versions of their copyrighted books, in forms such as 
audiobooks.‖213  But advocacy organizations, such as the WBU, 
challenge the sufficiency of this market solution because only five 
percent of U.S. annually published works are translated into VIP-
accessible formats, which of course includes audiobooks.
214
 
One may additionally look to audiobook publishers and sellers 
to gauge the quality of the audiobooks produced.  Audible, the 
largest seller of audiobooks on the internet, makes some 100,000-
plus works available to consumers.
215
  These 100,000-plus works 
comprise the greatest selection of audiobooks available out of all 
the literary and other creative works ever published, at least 
according to Audible itself.
216
  But if one takes the figure of 
100,000 as a fair estimate of all audiobooks ever published and 
compares it to annual book production, this figure is still not much 
                                                 
 212 In the context of corporate rights-holders, a lack of marketplace activity would 
indicate that VIP access would neither impair corporate property rights nor non-existent 
corporate moral rights.  In the case of individual rights-holders, moral rights could 
become a significant issue if individuals believed that VIP information access infringed a 
non-economic right, but such cases would seem to be the strong exception. 
 213 Huther Letter, supra note 180. 
 214 See discussion supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the five percent 
estimate for VIP-accessible formats). 
 215 About Audible, AUDIBLE, http://about.audible.com (last visited Nov. 9, 2011). 
 216 At least according to Audible itself. What is Audible?, AUDIBLE, 
http://www.audible.com/whatis? (last visited Nov. 9, 2011).  It is noteworthy here that 
audiobooks may be a ‗new‘ product in terms of mass-market appeal, but the concept of 
an audiobook dates to the production of mass-market audio recordings, or at minimum to 
the invention of the audio cassette, which can hold up to an hour of recording per 
cassette. 
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more than 1 in 3 books annually published in the United States.
217
  
Additionally, Audible ―audio content‖ includes radio programs, 
magazines, and other material not included in estimates of U.S. 
annual book production, and Audible‘s content is, as one might 




More significantly, many scholars—whether desirous of 
protecting attacks against human rights in any field or satisfied 
with national and international IP legal regimes—question whether 
there are any actual human rights obligations related to intellectual 
property.  Of note in this regard is the position of the United States 
with respect to copyright and human, or moral, rights.  In contrast 
to Europe, those who champion indigenous rights in the area of 
international copyright law, and indeed most of the rest of the 
world, the United States does not recognize moral rights as 
necessary to or inhering in copyright law.
219
  Rather, the essential 
                                                 
 217 Bowker Reports Traditional US Book Production Flat in 2009, BOWKER (Apr. 14, 
2010), http://www.bowker.com/index.php/press-releases/616-bowker-reports-traditional-
us-book-production-flat-in-2009.  Bowker is the exclusive vendor in the US for 
International Standard Book Number (ISBN) and Standard Address Numbering (SAN) 
processing and thus handles all new printed titles and editions of books. See id. 
 218 About Audible, supra note 215 (noting 85,000 ―audio programs‖ figure and that 
content providers include ―broadcasters, entertainers, [and] magazine and newspaper 
publishers‖).  As magazines, newspapers, and any audio ―performance‖ do not receive 
ISBNs, the 85,000 figure does not match up exactly with the Bowker figure, making the 1 
in 4 estimate a charitable one to treaty opponents and advocates of a market solution to 
the VIP information-access problem. See Products/Entities Eligible for ISBNs, BOWKER, 
http://www.isbn.org/standards/home/about/faqs2.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2010).  With 
respect to the works available through Audible, standard textbooks covering basic 
subjects such as geography, world history, and social sciences are absent from Audible‘s 
offerings. About Audible, supra note 215.  Indeed, even literary classics are generally 
unavailable in audiobook format; most published works tend to be current bestsellers.  Of 
course, this discussion is in no way meant as a criticism of Audible.  Rather, the example 
of Audible is clear evidence of what the market will produce in the way of appropriate-
format technologies.  Following the example of access to medicines—in particular, 
HIV/AIDS anti-retroviral therapy (ARV)—and the global pharmaceutical industry, the 
reasonable conclusion from the current lack of a sufficient market across the globe is that 
there is no economic incentive for creators and third parties to make works available in 
appropriate-format technologies at a price the world‘s VIPs can afford.  If that were the 
case, the market would produce those products, and it quite simply has not. 
 219 Pamela Samuelson, Economic and Constitutional Influences on Copyright Law in 
the United States, in US INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 164, 167 (Hugh 
Hansen ed., 2006).  
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bargain between authors of copyrightable works, who need to earn 
a living, and the government, that wishes to promote the creative 
arts, is held to be a sufficient and complete protection of the 
creator‘s economic interests.220 
b) The Treaty for the Blind Embodies Rights-Based 
Rather than Rights-Infringing Treaty Exemptions 
As noted, copyright holders generally oppose a WIPO treaty 
for the blind that includes broad exemptions because it is either 
inconsistent with the current paradigm of the global copyright 
regime or it infringes the rights of copyright holders to profit from 
their work.  Additionally, a WIPO treaty for the blind may be 
undesirable because although the proposed treaty language is 
limited to VIP rights and treaty advocates have not proposed such 
an extension, it is difficult to distinguish VIP information-access 
rights from other arguably basic rights.  Specifically, if VIPs are 
granted broad copyright exemptions so that they may have access 
to materials to realize their rights to education, employment, and 
other essential spheres of personhood, on what principle would one 
continue to refuse copyright exemptions to provide educational 
materials to all those who cannot afford them?
221
  This argument is 
what experts refer to as the ―thin edge of the wedge,‖222 and 
essentially what opponents to a treaty with broad exemptions 
highlight when they criticize broad exemptions as inconsistent with 
the global copyright regime.
223
  Broad exemptions might be used 
                                                 
 220 See U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8 cl. 8; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574–75 
(1994). 
 221 As James Love, the director of KEI, characterizes this argument,  
[t]he problem, on the right, is that it is felt to be opening a door to a 
wide range of new initiatives involving education, access to 
knowledge, across-the-board in other areas, because if you can do it 
for the blind, you can do it for these other groups.  So the idea is to 
have a cross-border exception—it has to be stopped is kind of that 
theory. 
Love, Fordham Conference, supra note 1, at 18.  
 222 E.g., Coenraad Visser, Fordham Eighteenth Annual Conference on International 
Intellectual Property Law and Policy, Session 8, Part A: Trade/Copyright: IP Trade 
Policy; WIPO Treaty for the Blind 34 (Apr. 9, 2010) (transcript on file with author). 
 223 Von Lewinski, Fordham Conference, supra note 87, at 43; Mark Seeley, Elsevier, 
Fordham Eighteenth Annual Conference on International Intellectual Property Law and 
Policy, Session 8, Part A: Trade/Copyright: IP Trade Policy; WIPO Treaty for the Blind 
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to provide materials, particularly in LDCs, to children with 
learning disabilities, assuming that such provision does not violate 
the three-step test.
224
  In this way, while broad piracy would not be 
on the horizon, this sort of gradual erosion could collapse 
substantial portions of international copyright protections.
225
 
2. Arguments about Economic Efficiency 
As discussed throughout this Note, the cost to nations and VIPs 
of coping with visual impairedness is significant.
226
  For VIPs, that 
                                                                                                             
44–46 (Apr. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Seeley, Fordham Conference] (transcript on file with 
author).  Of note, Professor von Lewinski is not an opponent of broad exemptions per se; 
rather, she is opposed to the content of the proposed exemptions as illegally expanding 
the three-step test of Berne and other international copyright treaties. 
 224 E.g., Woods, Fordham Conference, supra note 135, at 51 (noting discussions in the 
US on this issue).  However, it is also important to note that this concern largely derives 
from a philosophical difference between member states and various stakeholder groups.  
Immediately after the cited remark it is noted that: 
[o]n the other hand, in the United States, where that population [of 
learning disabled children] has been put at perhaps 23 million, that 
starts to look like a market, and a market that could be served.  
Maybe you need to look at some government role there in terms of 
funding to serve that market. . . . [T]here could be a market place 
solution there, and some other legislative solutions, perhaps licensing 
solutions, that could be facilitated by WIPO or by individual 
governments.  But it is something where we want to be very careful to 
keep the balance.  What we are talking about here essentially is 
addressing marketplace failures.  
Id. at 53 (emphasis added). 
 225 See Woods, Fordham Conference, supra note 135, at 52 (noting that expanding 
copyright exemptions in this matter would overturn the three-step test specifically, and 
that where such a solution involved million of individuals a marketplace solution that 
protects copyright is preferable generally to a statutory or treaty exemption).  Other 
proposals may have a more precipitous, rather than gradual, effect.  The proposal offered 
by Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, and Paraguay, for example, represents a significant change 
in international copyright law norms.  Article 4(a) of the Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico and 
Paraguay proposal states that ―[i]t shall be permitted without the authorisation of the 
owner of copyright to make an accessible format of a work, supply that accessible format, 
or copies of that format, to a visually impaired person by any means. . . .‖  WIPO 
Secretariat, Proposal by Brazil, Ecuador and Paraguay, Relating to Limitations and 
Exceptions: Treaty Proposed by the World Blind Union (WBU), art.4(a), SCCR/18/5 
(May 25, 2009).  This proposal would create copyright exemptions beyond the will of 
national legislatures, which no previous treaty does. See Von Lewinski, Fordham 
Conference, supra note 87, at 26–27. 
 226 E.g., notes 20–23 and accompanying text (discussing the economic cost to Australia 
of preventable visual impairment).  
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cost is born in rights delayed.
227
  Yet however strong support for a 
treaty for the blind may be, the push to realize and implement this 
instrument is not without its own costs: while some knowledgeable 
experts believe that a treaty is possible in the ―relatively short 
term,‖228 others believe that a treaty could be a decade or more 
away from adoption.
229
  The prospect of this delay and its effect on 
actualizing VIP rights presents one practical and theoretical 
objection to a WIPO copyright-exemption treaty for the blind. 
a) Copyright Exemptions Will Drive Further Global 
Piracy and Loss of Profits 
 Just as treaty proponents argue that state practice clashes 
with the economic principle of efficiency, treaty opponents argue 
that treaty exemptions clash with the economic principle of 
incentivization.  International copyright exemptions, in other 
words, will drive rampant global piracy, which will remove the 
financial incentive to create and disseminate copyrighted works.  
Thus, beyond even immediate losses to rights-holders, the rationale 
underpinning artistic creation will be to some degree imperiled 
should a WIPO treaty pass. 
As was noted previously, treaty opponents do not suggest that 
it will be VIPs or trusted intermediaries who will drive this piracy.  
Rather, the treaty itself, by providing a wrinkle to the otherwise 
clean sheet of international copyright protection, will allow 
advocates of greater consumer or user rights to pirate from rights 
                                                 
 227 Supra Part I.A-B. 
 228 Pooley, Fordham Conference, supra note 8 at 3.  Some opponents of a VIP 
copyright exemption treaty argue that a treaty is undesirable because it is an inefficient 
way to realize VIP rights.  These and other individuals note that even a treaty as 
relatively uncontentious as the proposed treaty could take up to fifteen years from the 
commencement of negotiations to finalize. See von Lewinski, Fordham Conference, 
supra note 87, at 26 (transcript on file with author). 
 229 Von Lewinski, Fordham Conference, supra note 87, at 23–24 (discussing the 1996 
WCT and WPPT treaties, both of which, despite the political will to adopt a treaty, 
required a ―twenty-year guided development period‖ and six years of negotiations, and 
noting that no such political will currently exists to adopt a VIP rights treaty).  Professor 
von Lewinski also prudently notes that in addition to the years and resources required to 
draft and adopt the treaty, there will still be delays in rights realization while VIPs await 
the necessary number of ratifications and at the least initial implementation phases. Id. at 
25–26.  For the WCT and WPPT, ratification took six years, despite significant pushes 
from the United States and other influential stakeholders to achieve ratification. Id. 
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holders.
230  This pirating, broad in geographical and societal scope, 
will ultimately erode the financial incentive that creators of 
copyrighted materials need to continue to create.
231
  Therefore, the 
WIPO treaty for the blind will ―begin to dismantle the existing 
global treaty structure of copyright law, through the adoption of an 
international instrument at odds with existing, longstanding and 
well-settled norms.‖232 
Treaty opponents cite the presence of users rights advocates, 
like the Electronic Frontier Foundation and Public Knowledge,
233
 
at WIPO SCCR meetings as evidence for the probability of this 
happening.  The presence of these groups at negotiations suggests 
to treaty opponents that passage of a treaty with broad exemptions 
will lead these groups to begin infringing copyrights on the basis 
of locating a broad users-rights principle in the treaty.  
Additionally, the treaty terms are arguably vague enough to 
include variability in interpretation that brings the scope of the 
treaty beyond VIPs.
234
  This concern is further driven by the fact 
that it will be applied internationally; without a consensus of 
common meanings and strong working relationships between the 
implementing nations, anyone could push to have the treaty 
                                                 
 230 See supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text (describing the ―thin edge of the 
wedge‖ argument).   
 231 Id.; James Manon, Who on Earth Would Oppose a Treaty to Facilitate Access to 
Information and Knowledge to People with Reading Disabilities?, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY 
INT‘L (Nov. 19, 2009, 10:04 AM), http://keionline.org/node/693. 
 232 Manon, supra note 251 (quoting Steven J. Metalitz, counsel for the MPAA and 
RIAA, among others). 
 233 Nineteenth Session Report, supra note 112. 
 234 Seeley, Fordham Conference, supra note 223, at 46–47  
I think, in terms of national exceptions that have developed over the 
years in many countries, there is greater comfort with those 
exceptions because, even if the statutory language starts off in a 
somewhat vague way, as they often do, they are then implemented 
through regulation, through legislation, and through practice.  So you 
build up that experience and that knowledge base.  I think what is of 
concern is the idea that some of the definitions that have been 
discussed would be so vague and would cover so many potential 
exceptions, plus they would be applied in a cross-border nature, 
which sort of means the potential for a race to the bottom in terms of 
what those exceptions might cover, so that the exceptions essentially 
take away the rule, in essence. 
Id.  
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exemptions pushed far beyond their agreed-upon scope and further 
erode the existing legal structure.
235
 
3. Arguments about Conflicts Between Legal Paradigms 
a) Exemptions Subvert the Dominant Trend in Copyright 
Law and the History of International Human Rights 
Law 
Seeking to protect potential remuneration for VIP-accessible 
materials markets, treaty opponents level a third type of argument: 
the treaty subverts international copyright law and, insofar as it 
seeks to enforce positive human rights obligations against private 
actors, subverts human rights law.  In claiming that a treaty for the 
blind would overturn international copyright law, treaty opponents 
rely heavily on two claims.  First, the three-step test is bedrock 
international copyright law.
236
  As previously discussed, the three-
step test has a long history and has been incorporated into all 
subsequent copyright treaties.
237
  Providing for mandatory 
copyright exemptions that do not explicitly meet the three-step test 
would, at minimum, conflict with the test and the Berne 
Convention‘s emphasis on permissive exceptions.238  Second, 
treaty opponents also claim that the three-step test is sufficiently 
flexible to accommodate VIP information-access needs.
239
  
                                                 
 235 Id.  It is notable in this regard that the exact same concerns could be raised against 
TRIPs, which, based on the dearth of criticism in this vein from rights-holders and their 
representatives, was satisfactorily implemented. 
 236 See, e.g., Metalitz Letter, supra note 180, at 3; Huther Letter, supra note 180, at 3–4 
(noting that beginning with the Berne Convention, ―[t]he current international intellectual 
property framework is based on harmonizing national laws or establishing ―minimum 
standards‖ of protection subject to flexibilities that permit limited exceptions.‖).  
 237 See supra Part I.C. 
 238 Von Lewinski, Fordham Conference, supra note 87, 25–26. 
 239 GWEN HINZE AND JANICE PILCH, REPLY COMMENTS OF THE LIBRARY COPYRIGHT 
ALLIANCE, THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, THE INTERNET ARCHIVE, AND THE 
CHIEF OFFICERS OF STATE LIBRARY AGENCIES 3 (Dec. 4, 2009), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sccr/comments/2009/reply-2/23-gwen-hynze-and-janice-
pilch.pdf.   
Eminent international copyright experts agree that it is possible to 
frame exceptions or limitations to national copyright laws for the 
benefit of the visually impaired and those with reading disabilities in 
a way that complies with the parameters of the international 
copyright framework, and specifically the three-step test, embodied 
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Specifically, treaty opponents do not believe that treaty proponents 
have shown that three-step test is incapable of meeting VIPs needs, 
and therefore there is no reason to work outside of the test to 
further information access.
240
  Thus, the treaty would overturn 
foundational principles of international law absent a clear 
indication that existing frameworks are inadequate. 
Additionally, treaty opponents argue that a WIPO treaty for the 
blind is impermissible because it would essentially force private 
actors to act positively toward other private actors, which is 
beyond the scope of international human rights law.  These 
obligations, as the preambles to all of these treaties clearly 
indicate, concern State-to-State conduct.
241
  Even if one accepts 
that some human rights obligations are clearly directed toward 
private persons as well as States Parties,
242
 those obligations are 
negative—a claim on private persons to refrain from doing 
something.  Providing one‘s creations to another free of charge, in 
contrast, is a positive act, and international human rights law does 
not obligate private actors in such a way.
243
  Therefore, a treaty for 
                                                                                                             
in Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention, concerning the reproduction 
right, and expanded for rights recognized in TRIPs (Article 13), and 
in Article 10 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and Article 16 of the 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty.  
Id. (citing Sullivan Study, supra note 3, at 97–132). 
 240 E.g., Metalitz Letter, supra note 180, at 3 ([T]here has been no demonstration that 
this authorization for the recognition of exceptions and limitations is too limited or too 
rigid to advance this goal.‖). 
 241 E.g., ICESCR, supra note 37, pmbl.  
 242 Hestermeyer, for example, cites the prohibition against slavery in ICCPR Article 
8(1) as an example of a treaty obligation that is ostensibly between States Parties only, 
but which clearly applies to private actors as well. HESTERMEYER, supra note 48, at 95.  
 243 One counter argument to this line of reasoning is that international human rights 
law, in the form of treaties and state practice, has extended its power to private actors.  
With respect to state practice, Portuguese, American and German laws bind corporations 
to positively act to respect human rights. Id. at 94–96 (citing Constituição da República 
Portuguesa a [Port.] (1993; 3rd rev. ed. 1993.), art. 18V (Port.); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000d to d-7 (1964); and Deutscher Bundestag: Allgemeines 
Gleichbehandlungsgesetz [BT] 833/06 (Ger.)).  Some commentators further argue that 
because corporations are economically more powerful than many nations, human rights 
obligations are fairly applied to them as well. Id. at 95 (2007) (citing Mahmood 
Monshipouri et al., Multinational Corporations and the Ethics of Global Responsibility: 
Problems and Possibilities, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 965, 971-73, 978-86 (2003)).  Corporate 
responsibility, with respect to access to medicine in particular, is currently a hot topic 
among human rights lawyers. See, e.g., Lissett Ferreira, Note, Access to Affordable HIV/ 
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the blind would similarly contravene international human rights 
law principles. 
4. Arguments about Practical Political Concerns 
a) A Treaty Is Premature Because Many Nations Lack 
Sufficient Negotiating Resources and Expertise 
One of the primary criticisms of TRIPs is that it is a 
fundamentally unfair agreement, given the fact that many LDCs 
and even developing nations lacked the expertise at the negotiating 
table, to fully represent their interests.
244
  Similarly, although 
                                                                                                             
AIDS Drugs: The Human Rights Obligations of Multinational Pharmaceutical 
Corporations, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1133, 1172 (2002) (advocating a ―soft law‖ 
obligation under the multilateral corporate codes of conduct to respect developing states‘ 
efforts to protect the right to affordable HIV/AIDS treatment). 
 244 Aside from the United States and the other select developed nations that increased 
their intellectual property rents through TRIPs, the only consensus around TRIPs seems 
to be that it harms LDCs. World Bank, Global Economic Prospects and the Developing 
Countries: Making Trade Work for the World’s Poor, 133 at Table 5.1 (2002), available 
at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2002 
/02/16/000094946_0202020411334/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf (noting that based on 
a 2000 model assuming full TRIPs implementation, only developed countries would 
experience a significant increase in patent payments, although ultimately the selected 
LDCs would see a comparatively minor benefit from implementation through an increase 
in foreign direct investment (FDI)).  Commentators and NGOs who believe that TRIPs 
definitively and strictly harms LDCs argue, inter alia, that TRIPs siphons billions of 
dollars from LDCs to rights-holder states, drives lower life expectancies and health-
related quality of life among persons in LDCs by disincentivizing pharmaceutical 
companies to invest in drugs that would help eradicate preventable diseases and 
preventing death in LDCs.  Lawrence O. Gostin, Redressing the Unconscionable Health 
Gap: A Global Plan for Justice, 4 HARV. L. & POL‘Y REV. 271, 282 (2010) (―The 
issuance of patents often allows companies to charge monopoly prices that developing 
countries cannot afford, and rich states have actively pursued increasingly restrictive 
intellectual property rules through multilateral treaties such as TRIPs and bilateral 
agreements such as the TRIPs amendments commonly referred to as TRIPs-plus.  As a 
result, private drug companies have little incentive to invest in research that will reduce 
the disease burden in poor countries.‖).  For this perspective with respect to indigenous 
rights, see Michael H. Davis, Some Realism about Indigenism, 11 CARDOZO J. INT‘L & 
COMP. L. 815, 824 (2003) (―Surely, TRIPS is the biggest disaster faced by the Third 
World since the end of the territorial-based colonial era.‖).  For an argument that TRIPs 
creates problems because of its lack of controls on enforcing agents, see Laurence R. 
Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the TRIPs Agreement: The Case for a 
European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 357 (1998).  In particular, 
commentators criticize TRIPs because according to them, many LDC representatives 
were not capable of adequately representing their interests during negotiations, 
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nearly fifteen years have passed since TRIPs was signed, a treaty 
for the blind arguably risks repeating the same failure, as some 
LDCs still lack the requisite expertise to protect and advance their 




                                                                                                             
particularly when faced with the combined and coordinated power of the United States, 
the European Union, and other Northern representatives. WATAL, supra note 130, at 19–
21. 
 245 Commentators do generally agree that in the fifteen years since TRIPs, there is 
enough maturity across nations to have general-level discussion on international 
copyright law. Pooley, Fordham Conference, supra note 8, at 7.  This statement should be 
contrasted with the consensus among academics that, especially at the time of the 
negotiations in the mid-1980s that laid the foundation for the TRIPs agreement, 
developing countries had little to no IP expertise and were not sophisticated enough to 
understand the importance of seemingly innocuous language in agreements formed out of 
those discussions. See Matthew Turk, Note, Bargaining and Intellectual Property 
Treaties: The Case for a Pro-Development Interpretation of TRIPs but not TRIPs Plus, 
42 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 981, 993 n. 48 (quoting J.P. SINGH, NEGOTIATION AND THE 
GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 87 (2008) (―In the case of IPRs [referring to the 
Ministerial Declaration], the developed countries had slipped in an agenda without the 
developing countries taking much notice.‖)); WATAL, supra note 130, at 21 (―Many 
developing countries agreed to this text, believing that they could limit the negotiations 
primarily on trade in counterfeit goods and other such trade-related aspects.  This was a 
misreading not only of the text but also of the writing on the wall.‖).  Singh also notes 
that because of a superior use of tactics by the U.S., the EU and Japan; the 
aforementioned lack of sophistication in international IP negotiations among developed 
countries; and the lack of coordination–especially relative to the ‗North‘—among 
developing countries, representatives for the developing countries were often in the 
position of choosing between the lesser of two evils: the restrictive positions of TRIPS or 
economic sanctions through Section 301 of the United States Trade of 1974. Turk, supra, 
at 994–95 (citing J.P. SINGH, NEGOTIATION AND THE GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 78 
(2008)).  There is no consensus, however, on whether the requisite level of experience 
and knowledge that permits broad principles to be applied according to the parties‘ 
understanding is present among all WIPO member states. Seeley, Fordham Conference, 
supra note 223, at 47 (―[I]n terms of national exceptions that have developed over the 
years in many countries, there is greater comfort with those exceptions because, even if 
the statutory language starts off in a somewhat vague way, as they often do, they are then 
implemented through regulation, through legislation, and through practice.  So you build 
up that experience and that knowledge base.‖).  The implication of this quote is that 
copyright holders are comfortable with vague exemption-granting language because they 
are comfortable with the legal environment in which these vague words become the 
realized intentions of the parties.  By extension, at least some significant rights-holders 
feel that this level of comfort simply does not exist in the international arena.  However, 
one may respond that this is one benefit to lengthy treaty discussions: parties will over 
time come to basic understandings, and eventually bases of knowledge, that assure the 
rights-holder that exemptions will not be abused via vague treaty language.  Moreover, 
international NGOs that can serve as trusted intermediaries are likely to be more familiar 
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The content of this treaty is not of the magnitude of TRIPs, 
however, so the ramifications for an unfavorable agreement are 
comparatively less severe.
246
  Moreover, a WIPO treaty for the 
blind may be the only proverbial ―bite at the apple‖ for remedying 
a basic human rights deficiency.  If this proverb holds true and the 
representatives of the nations where the vast majority of VIPs 
reside cannot represent their interests, it is reasonable to assume 
that those interests may be prejudiced during the present 
negotiations, and a treaty should not be created.
247
 
b) A Treaty Would Waste Valuable Political Capital on 




 Beyond arguments about the appropriateness of using a 
treaty versus non-binding obligations versus deployment of 
resources in other areas, a WIPO treaty for the blind might be 
inadvisable because it wastes WIPO SCCR consensus resources on 
any treaty or international agreement, not merely a VIP rights 
agreement.  Recognizing this, representatives of LDCs, particularly 
in African nations, have voiced some displeasure with the prospect 
of other states pushing hard for this treaty. 
As with any political body, there is limited negotiating capital 
among all state parties for any given topic of discussion, and 
smaller and/or resource- or politically-poor nations are even further 
constrained, as they possess even less negotiating capital.
249
  
                                                                                                             
with the legal environment of the nations in which most rights-holders are found, and so 
may be a practical way for wary rights-holders to become more comfortable with 
expanded copyright exemptions. 
 246 TRIPs covers copyright, trademarks, industrial designs, patents, and many other 
areas of intellectual property, whereas the treaty under debate is limited to copyright 
only.  TRIPs, supra note 66, arts. 9–39. 
 247 One interesting question is whether the compulsory licensing scheme that TRIPs 
provides for patents may be fairly and effectively applied to copyright law in order to 
provide VIPs with appropriate-format materials.  Denise Nicholson, a major stakeholder 
in South Africa‘s copyright-law discussions, has stated that at least for her nation, 
advocating for a solution based on compulsory licenses would be of no help at all. 
STORY, supra note 165, at 48. 
 248 See, e.g., Love, Fordham Conference, supra note 1, at 19 (recalling an SCCR 
national delegate‘s characterization of VIP rights as a ―‗miniscule‘ development‖). 
 249 E.g., Jane Kelsey, World Trade and Small Nations in the South Pacific Region, 14 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 247, 263 (Winter 2005) (quoting Cancun Ministerial Conference, 
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Because the proposed treaty would address a violation that affects 
only a minority of any nation‘s citizens, some representatives 
believe that the WIPO SCCR should concentrate its efforts on 
more basic and immediately development-oriented agreements.  As 
one human rights commentator noted when speaking of his 
nation‘s and continent‘s priorities, ―when most schools across 
Africa do not have anywhere near enough books or a photocopier 
or even a single computer, copyright is not really an issue. I wish it 
was.‖250 
Noteworthy in this regard is the work of the SCCR 
stakeholders group, composed of VIP advocates and other 
interested parties.  In less than a year after its founding in January 
2009, the Stakeholders‘ Platform for NGOs and other interested 
parties has been able to forge licensing deals with several rights-
holder parties.
251
  Licensing deals with major copyright holders 
arguably are a feasible alternative, especially where states can 
                                                                                                             
Fiji: Statement by the Honourable Kaliopate Tavola on Behalf of Small Vulnerable 
Economies, par. 4, WT/MIN(03)/ST/87 (Sept. 12, 2003)  
The WTO claims to be a multilateral trading organisation, which 
addresses the circumstances of all its Members, and whose rules 
provide a balance of advantage for all its constituents.  However, this 
is unfortunately not true for the small, vulnerable economies whose 
limited negotiating capital and small size limit their ability to cope 
with the complex multilateral rules, does not allow for effective 
bargaining to secure specific measures which address our 
development needs, and thus has prevented us from participating 
effectively in the negotiation of WTO provisions more suited to 
enhancing our welfare.. 
Id. 
 250 STORY, supra note 165, at 13 (quoting Colin Darch).  See also Matthew Turk, Note, 
Bargaining and Intellectual Property Treaties: The Case for A Pro-Development 
Interpretation of TRIPs but not TRIPs Plus, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 981, 1009 
(noting that many LDCs treat IP negotiations as ―little more than a bargaining chip as 
part of broader negotiation‖ and a ―costless choice [because f]or those countries, the harm 
that may result from excessive copyright controls pales in comparison to more 
fundamental development concerns.‖ (quoting Michael Geist, Why We Must Stand on 
Guard Over Copyright, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 20, 2003, at D3)).  However, other African 
nations have strongly supported a robust treaty.  Angola, for example, stated at the 
November 2010 SCCR meeting that ―the issue on limitations and exceptions [is] critical 
for Africa.  Access to information and communication for people with disabilities and 
other persons in the educational, political, economic, cultural and social arenas was 
important for development.‖ Twentieth Session Report, supra note 99, at ¶ 21. 
 251 Nineteenth Session Report, supra note 112, at ¶ 75. 
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negotiate deals with rights-holder representatives or agents,
252
 
which would decrease negotiating costs to VIPs.  Depending on 
the strength of these licensing deals and the path of treaty 
negotiations over the next several meetings, advocates for this line 
of argument could amass additional evidence that negotiating 
capital is better utilized on other topics. 
III. YES, THERE SHOULD BE A TREATY FOR THE BLIND: WHY THE 
WIPO SCCR SHOULD RECOGNIZE THE HUMAN RIGHTS 
OBLIGATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL IP COMMUNITY VIS-A-VIS VIP 
RIGHTS 
Contrary to the opinions of both many proponents and 
opponents of a treaty for the blind, the issue is not best captured in 
rights language; it is best captured in the numbers.  No national 
scheme, nor any international coalition of the willing, has been 
able to provide meaningful access to VIPs.  For the United States, 
the Chafee Amendment and market solutions have at best yielded 
no more than five percent of available works in an appropriate 
format.
253
  European Union nations have not been able to achieve 
greater gains.
254
  In other words, developed nations have not done 
much better than LDCs in providing accessible works to VIPs. 
In the face of such facts, it becomes clear that what is 
important is that a consensus be reached.
255
  Even if the exact 
                                                 
 252 The EUAIN has been successful in this regard, for example, negotiating with the 
Federation of European Publishers, holder of the copyrights to approximately 85 percent 
of European publications. See WIPO Vision IP, Best Practices—European Accessible 
Information Network (EUAIN) (2010), http://visionip.org/vip_resources/en/best_ 
practices/euain.html. 
 253 See supra notes 138 (acceptance of the five-percent figure for the United States) and 
227 (arguing for market-based solutions for the information-access problem whenever 
possible).  Of note here, other sources indicate that the U.S. actually does no better than 
the LDCs. NAT‘L FED‘N FOR THE BLIND, REGARDING THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION, THE 
WORLDWIDE BOOK FAMINE, AND THE NEED AND URGENCY TO ADOPT AN INTERNATIONAL 
TREATY THEREON, 2011–16 (2011), available at http://www.nfb.org/images/nfb 
/Publications/bm/bm11/bm1108/bm110816.htm (stating that only one percent of works 
are available in a VIP-accessible format). 
 254 See supra note 4 (noting the five percent figure for the Netherlands and generally). 
 255 See Tobin, supra note 36, at 6–7 (2010); see also supra Part I.B for perspective on 
the range of legal frameworks, or absence thereof, for providing VIPs with accessible 
works. 
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meanings of the words memorializing the consensus are 
ambiguously and somewhat variously interpreted,
256
 the value of a 
treaty for the blind is not just in the treaty language.  The value lies 
in the expression of political consensus.
257
 
Moreover, the strength of such an expression of consensus 
depends on the creation of a binding document.  While precatory 
instruments such as those advanced by the European Union and the 
United States can of course be an expression of consensus, in this 
case a precatory instrument is insufficient.  The reasons are 
manifold, including the fact that treaty opponents state that the 
Berne Convention permits sufficient copyright exemptions yet 
fewer than half of WIPO nations have any such statutory 
exemption,
258
 that LDCs have traditionally been unsuccessful in 
negotiating beneficial international IP instruments and often are 
willing to bargain away IP rights for other developmental concerns 
anyway,
259
 and that human rights treaties that would seem to do the 
work of a treaty for the blind have not improved the situation.
260
  
All of these reasons strengthen the belief that a non-binding 
agreement would not preserve any consensus to improve VIP 
                                                 
 256 Tobin, supra note 36, at 3.  
[I]n practice there is rarely, if ever, universal agreement as to where . 
. . boundaries should be placed.  Instead of offering the stability 
necessary [to establish strict objective meanings], the rules 
themselves remain constantly in need of interpretation . . .  This does 
not mean that the meaning of a human right under an international 
treaty is radically indeterminate in the sense of never being capable 
of holding a meaning.  Instead, the accepted meaning of any term at a 
particular point in time will be that which attracts and achieves 
dominance over all other alternative understandings within the 
relevant interpretive community.  When seen from this perspective, 
the act of interpretation is more than simply the attribution or 
communication of a meaning.  It is ultimately an act of persuasion—
an attempt to convince the relevant interpretive community that a 
particular meaning from within a suite of potential meanings is the 
most appropriate interpretation to adopt. 
Id.  
 257 Id. at 7.   
 258 Supra note 71. 
 259 Supra notes 255 (discussing the comparative unimportance of IP rights for LDCs) 
and accompanying text, and 133–34 and accompanying text (discussing the failure of 
LDCs in the TRIPs treaty negotiations). 
 260 Supra Parts I.C. and II.A.1.b. 
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information access.  It is only when the overall relationship is 
defined in terms of binding nations to commitments supporting the 
right of access that a lasting consensus can be forged,
261
 and the 
situation can begin to improve for VIPs. 
This is not to say that the actual language of the treaty itself is 
unimportant.  Indeed, if the treaty language is vague, or mirrors 
what already exists, or is insufficient to persuade national actors of 
what now needs to be implemented in order to establish 
compliance, then the international consensus of the document 
would be relatively meaningless.
262
 
Regardless of whether or not the WIPO achieves a treaty for 
the blind, the strong tension that persists in rights language 
between intellectual property rights-holder and holders of human 
rights needs to be addressed.  This tension may be resolved in two 
ways.  First, there is a substantial difference between the moral 
rights of creators and the economic incentives to foster production 
that many nations call intellectual property protection.
263
  Moral 
rights of creators can be considered human rights without the 
                                                 
 261 See Tobin, supra note 36, at 49–50 (―[U]nity and an agreed meaning can be 
achieved when the ‗participants in the enterprise share an interest in preserving the 
overall relationship.‘‖ (quoting Ian Johnstone, Treaty Interpretation: The Authority of 
Interpretive Communities, 12 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 371, 407 (1991))).  This can be seen in the 
debate, begun virtually as soon as TRIPs was passed, over the meaning of the emergency 
provision of Article 31, which allowed nations to bypass the voluntary license negotiating 
stage, in times of ―national emergencies‖ or ―other circumstances of extreme urgency.‖ 
HESTERMEYER, supra note 49, at 239–52.  It can also be seen in the failure of both 
developed and less-developed nations to improve access to visually impaired works, even 
though, as some experts argue, existing international treaties do provide for far higher 
levels of access than currently exist.  ―[E]ven the [current] conventions and the 
agreements on intellectual property rights have paved the way, have allowed the member 
countries to do something for people with disabilities.  They do not need to wait for the 
international treaty.  They can do it now, especially people who are high-minded with the 
protection of human rights.‖). Weeraworawit, Fordham Conference, supra note 149, at 
31. 
 262 See discussion supra notes 238–42 and 258–78, and accompanying text (discussing 
the pitfalls of overly broad, overly vague, and non-consensus-based international 
instruments).  Tobin also notes that ―[i]t is by no means certain that agreement on a text 
in any way implies agreement as to intentions.‖ Tobin, supra note 36, at 23. 
 263 This follows from the definition of moral rights. Helfer, Collective Management, 
supra note 163. 
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obligations attendant thereto conflicting with consumer rights.
264
  
That is, these moral rights are in fact far more flexible than legal 
copyright protections, as they guarantee an inalienable relation to a 
creator‘s works and a reasonable profit therefrom.265  Thus, in 
many instances these human rights can be reconciled with the 
rights of consumers to access information to ensure social and 
political participation.  Second, as the CESCR Committee has 
noted, ―a human rights-based approach focuses particularly on the 
needs of the most disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and 
communities.‖266  That is, casting the conflict as between two 
human rights oversimplifies the issue.  The conflicts do not exist 
outside of their context, which in this case is the need of persons in 
developing nations with comparatively few resources. 
It may be that the best solution, in terms of resource efficiency 
and consistency in global copyright law, is to transition production 
of these services to traditional copyright holders, i.e., 
Western/Northern corporations.  To advocate for market 
stimulation or the existence of a rapidly developing and soon-
sufficient market solution, however, when a market solution has 
not presented itself in the several decades in which there has been a 
need for these materials and the technology with which to produce 
and deliver them, falls flat.
267
 
                                                 
 264 See supra notes 208–35 and accompanying text (noting that the failure of market 
solutions generally does not implicate creators‘ rights in the VIP copyright exemption). 
 265 HESTERMEYER, supra, note 48, at 84–85. 
 266 The committee continues,  
Because a human right is a universal entitlement, its implementation 
is evaluated particularly by the degree to which it benefits those who 
hitherto have been the most disadvantaged and marginalized and 
brings them up to the mainstream level of protection.  Thus, in 
adopting intellectual property regimes, States and other actors must 
give particular attention at the national and international levels to the 
adequate protection of the human rights of disadvantaged and 
marginalized individuals and groups, such as indigenous peoples.  
CESCR., Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Follow-up to the day of general discussion on 
article 15.1 (c), Monday, 26 November 2001, ¶ 8 E/C.12/2001/15 (Dec. 14, 2001), 
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/statements/E.C.12.2001. 
15HRIntel-property.pdf.  
 267 See discussion supra notes 4 and 138 (noting that the five percent estimate is widely 
cited and relatively undisputed). See also supra note 218 and accompanying text 
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CONCLUSION 
As Martti Koskenniemi suggests, a human rights obligation 
such as providing VIPs with access to information that reasonably 
approximates mainstream availability may not inspire state action 
precisely because it seems obvious that this should be done.
268
  
When one asks the question ―who could possibly be against a 
treaty for the blind?,‖ the answer seems similarly obvious: VIPs 
ought not, especially when the political will, financial resources 
and requisite technology all appear to exist, go without up to 
ninety-nine percent of the written information that the world 
produces.  But as this Note endeavored to show, a solution to this 
problem is anything but easy, and agreeing on and implementing 
one brings into play powerful competing interests. 
The arguments of the opponents of the WIPO treaty for the 
blind are insufficient to overcome the simple facts of VIP harm.  
Certain human rights treaties attempt to provide VIP protection 
from this very harm, but states have inadequately implemented 
such protection.  Thus there is a need for private action, because 
states give private actors the right to own and profit from their 
intellectual property—the very property to which VIPs deserve 
access.  If private actors holding the copyrights to these materials 
have not made them available at a reasonable price to VIPs, they 
have clearly stated that the appropriate-format market is not a 
market worth pursuing.  And if this is true, rights-holders suffer 
little actual harm by extending copyright to VIPs, most of whom 
could not purchase protected works at any price anyway.  If a 
WIPO treaty for the blind ultimately means that there is one more 
wrinkle in what ideally would be a smooth sheet of international 
copyright law, then the appropriate response should be: so be it. 
                                                                                                             
(discussing the number of audiobooks available and their quality with respect to realizing 
the rights at issue). 
 268 HESTERMEYER, supra note 48, at 124. 
